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During	the	summer	months	there	has	been	some	weakening	of	global	activity,	
accompanied	by	a	fall-off	in	world	trade.	These developments took place against 
a background of rising global uncertainty and deteriorating confidence, associated 
with the intensification of trade and geopolitical tensions. From the viewpoint of the 
components of demand, the increase in uncertainty has affected investment in 
particular. Private consumption, in contrast, is behaving relatively more favourably 
because employment and, therefore, household incomes have held up. By sector, 
the negative effects of the developments observed were stronger in manufacturing, 
in line with the deterioration of trade, than in services.
By	geographic	area,	activity	is	proving	more	resilient	in	the	United	States	and	
China	than	in	Europe	and	in	most	of	the	emerging	economies. In the euro area, 
Germany is being especially affected, given the high weight of exports and industrial 
sectors in its economy and, in particular, the importance of the production of capital 
goods, on top of which there was the specific shock suffered by the automotive 
industry.
Moreover,	 in	 August,	 the	 financial	 markets	 reacted	 to	 the	 increase	 in	
uncertainty. The increase in global risk aversion led to a shift in flows towards safe 
assets, with notable declines in sovereign debt yields, increases in corporate bond 
spreads and a rise in stock market volatility. Also, emerging currencies weakened 
against the dollar and commodity prices fell. In September, these movements tended 
to be reversed, and in the case of the oil price, this tendency has been reinforced 
more recently by the supply problems resulting from the attacks on Saudi Arabian oil 
facilities.
In	 this	 context,	 global	 growth	 projections	 depend	 upon	 the	 assumptions	
regarding	the	degree	of	persistence	of	the	current	sources	of	uncertainty.	In 
the central scenario of numerous recent forecasts, the uncertainty dissipates after a 
few quarters and a path of robust expansion is then resumed. In this scenario, both 
intensification and persistence of the current slowdown are ruled out.1 However, in 
other scenarios, the uncertainty takes longer to ease, in which case it would be more 
difficult for developments in the services sector to remain decoupled from those in 
1 OVERVIEW
1  This is the case of the latest ECB staff projections for the euro area. The assumption translates into a 
downward	revision	of	the	GDP	and	consumer	price	growth	paths.	Specifically,	the	revision	in	the	case	of	
output	is	of	0.1	and	0.2	percentage	points	(pp)	in	2019	and	2020,	respectively,	and	in	the	case	of	underlying	
inflation	0.1	pp	in	both	2020	and	2021.
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the manufacturing sector and for the relatively positive tempo of employment to be 
sustained. Also, the negative effects of factors such as obstacles to trade and a 
hypothetical disorderly Brexit are not limited to a negative short-term demand 
impact, but also entail negative consequences for productivity and investment at 
longer time horizons.
Economic	 developments	 in	 recent	 months	 have	 led	 to	 the	 adoption	 of	
expansionary	monetary	policy	measures.	The weakening of activity during the 
summer, the deterioration in the economic outlook and continued low levels of 
inflation (in some cases, well below monetary policy targets), prompted a reaction by 
central banks. Specifically, the US Federal reserve has reduced the target range for 
its reference rate by 25 basis points on two occasions (in July and September). Also, 
it has brought forward completion of the reduction in the size of its balance sheet by 
a few months. 
Meanwhile,	 the	 Governing	 Council	 of	 the	 European	 Central	 Bank	 (ECB)	
decided,	at	 its	meeting	of	12	September,	to	adopt	a	number	of	measures	to	
increase	 the	degree	of	monetary	 accommodation. The package of measures 
includes a 10 basis point (bp) reduction in the interest rate on the deposit facility to 
-0.50%. The Governing Council also modified its forward guidance on the period in 
which it expects interest rates to remain at their present or lower levels, replacing the 
previous time reference with a formulation under which the path of rates depends on 
convergence of the inflation outlook, within its projection horizon, to a level sufficiently 
close to, but below, 2%, and on such convergence being reflected in underlying 
inflation dynamics. In addition, the restart of net asset purchases was announced, 
which will continue until shortly before the first rise in key ECB interest rates, as well 
as the reinvestment of the assets in its portfolio as they mature for an extended 
period of time, past the first rise in key ECB interest rates. Finally, in order to support 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism, certain parameters of the longer term 
refinancing transactions for euro area financial institutions (known as TLTRO-III) 
were recalibrated and a mechanism was introduced for reserve remuneration, under 
which part of banks’ holdings of excess liquidity is exempt from the negative deposit 
facility rate.
At	 the	 same	 time,	 a	 growing	 consensus	 is	 emerging	 on	 the	 advisability	 of	
expansionary	monetary	policies	being	complemented	by	the	contribution	of	
other	 economic	policies.	Monetary policy has performed a very important role 
following the crisis by maintaining accommodative financing conditions to support 
private spending and by bringing inflation rates close to target. However, the capacity 
of this instrument to affect the economy is not unlimited. In the euro area, the ECB 
accompanied its recent package of monetary policy measures with calls for the 
adoption of a reform agenda to boost potential growth and for fiscal policy 
collaboration which, in the absence of an instrument at euro area level, depends on 
those national governments that have fiscal space available.
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In	Spain	too,	signs	of	activity	weakening	have	also	been	observed. On National 
Statistics Institute (INE) estimates, the 0.5% rate of GDP growth recorded in Q1 was 
maintained in Q2 (see Chart 1).2 By component, there was a notable weakening in 
domestic demand, along with a decline in investment in capital goods, in keeping 
with the uncertainty stemming from the external environment and with the weakness 
of manufacturing sectors. The slowdown in world trade was also apparent in the 
sluggishness of exports. In addition, the growth rate of private consumption was 
zero, possibly also reflecting the rise in uncertainty. The slowdown in final demand 
translated into very low import growth, and thus a significant positive contribution to 
output growth from the net external balance. 
For	the	summer	months,	the	indicators	point	to	a	modest	additional	slowdown	
in	activity. Output in Q3 may have grown by 0.4%, relative to Q2. In particular, Social 
Security registration data have shown a loss of buoyancy since May which, although 
very marked in construction and industry, has also affected the various services 
industries. This sectoral pattern has also been replicated by other indicators of 
activity developments. The slowdown observed has, however, been milder than in 
the euro area as a whole. In the context of uncertainty described, the information 
available points to a prolongation of the current stage of certain short-term activity 
weakness. 
MAIN SPANISH MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES (a)
Table 1
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Information available to19 September 2019. The shaded cells in grey are Banco de España projections.
b Contribution to the quarter-on-quarter rate of change of GDP, in percentage points.
c The figure for 2019 Q3 is the average of the July and August year-on-year rates.
91028102
2017 2018 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
National accounts
Quarter-on-quarter rate of change, unless otherwise indicated
4.05.05.06.05.05.05.04.29.2tcudorp citsemod ssorG    
5.01.03.02.04.07.06.06.20.3)b( dnamed lanoitan fo noitubirtnoC    
2.0-4.02.04.01.03.0-1.0-3.0-1.0-)b( dnamed lanretxe ten fo noitubirtnoC    
Year-on-year rate of change
6.14.27.27.25.24.26.25.28.2tnemyolpmE    
5.01.11.18.13.28.11.17.10.2)PCIH( secirp remusnoc fo xedni desinomraH
Harmonised index of consumer prices excluding energy
and food 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1 0.8 1.2 1.1
Price indicators (c)
2	 	On	16	September,	 the	 INE	published	 revised	annual	National	Accounts	 time	series	 (see	Box	8).	 It	also	
released quarterly time series consistent with the annual ones.
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Over	the	next	two	years,	the	current	growth	phase	is	expected	to	continue,	
albeit	 	with	a	 lower	growth	 rate	 than	 in	 recent	years. The projections for the 
Spanish economy presented in Box 1 envisage, on the assumption that the current 
uncertainties will tend to dissipate beyond the short-term, a continuation of the 
current growth phase, against a background of persistence of very favourable 
financial conditions for spending, prolongation of the process of job creation (albeit 
at a more moderate rate than in the past), real wage increases and recovery in the 
growth of world trade. In comparison with the June projections, the current ones 
reflect a moderate worsening of the outlook for activity. The downward revision to 
the average annual GDP growth rate for 2019 amounts to 0.4 pp. This is partly a 
result of the automatic effect of the new National Accounts time series, which now 
estimate lower output growth at the beginning of the year, and partly of less favourable 
projections for Q2.3 The downward revision to GDP growth in 2020 is 0.2 pp and in 
2021, 0.1 pp.
The	 central	 scenario	 for	 economic	 activity	 developments	 is	 subject	 to	
significant	 downside	 risks. In particular, as mentioned above, the outlook of 
Despite the slowdown in expected growth for Q3, activity in Spain continues to post higher rates than in the euro area. Consumer prices 
continue to grow at a moderate rate, somewhat below that for the euro area as a whole.
SPAIN: ACTIVITY REMAINS BUOYANT AND CONSUMER PRICES ARE HOLDING AT A LOW RATE OF INCREASE (a)
Chart 1
SOURCES: Eurostat INE and Banco de España.
a Quarter-on-quarter rates of change on the seasonally adjusted series in the case of GDP, and year-on-year rates of change on the original 
series, in the case of the consumer price indices.
b The figure for Q3 is a Banco de España projection.
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3	 	See	González	Mínguez,	J.	and	C.	Martínez	Carrascal	(2019),	The relationship between average annual and 
quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rates: implications for projections and macroeconomic analysis,	Banco	de	
España.
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continued output and employment growth in the economy rests on the assumption 
that the sources of uncertainty that have weighed on the world economy in recent 
quarters will tend to be dispelled beyond the short term. However, the hypothetical 
introduction of new protectionist threats would give rise to prolongation of the 
current phase of weakness in world trade. Also, a possible disorderly Brexit would 
entail a negative shock with potentially significant implications for euro area activity. 
Finally, in China, there is a risk of a sharper slowdown than at present, which could 
entail greater weakness of international trade flows. Domestically, the ongoing 
political stalemate and absence of legislative activity is delaying the adoption of the 
measures needed to address the vulnerabilities that still afflict the Spanish economy 
and to raise its growth capacity. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 3/2019  QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
This box describes the most notable features of the 
update to the Banco de España’s macroeconomic 
projections for the Spanish economy published on 7 June 
2019.1 In particular, the present projections take on board 
the changes to the technical assumptions arising from the 
new information that became available between the two 
exercises (see Table 1)2 and the latest National Accounts 
data. The latter include a revision made by the National 
Statistics Institute (INE) to the time series for the period 
1995-2018 and, also, preliminary results for the quarterly 
time series up to 2019 Q2 (see Box 8). This recent revision 
of the National Accounts time series means that it is 
particularly hard to make comparisons with the June 
projections.3
The present projections point to continuation of the 
Spanish economy’s expansionary phase over the period 
2019‑2021 (see Table  2). Growth will continue to be 
underpinned by the accommodative stance of monetary 
policy, reinforced by the measures adopted by the 
Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) at 
its last meeting, the favourable financial position of firms 
and households on aggregate (although some groups of 
agents are still in a comparatively vulnerable situation), 
Box 1
MACROECONOMIC	PROJECTIONS	FOR	SPAIN	(2019-2021)
1  Macroeconomic	projections	for	the	Spanish	economy	(2019-2021):	the	Banco	de	España’s	contribution	to	the	Eurosystem’s	June	
2019 joint forecasting exercise.
2	 	The	June	2019	projections	were	based	on	the	information	available	as	at	15	May	for	those	variables	that	have	a	bearing	on	the	
projections.	In	the	latest	exercise	the	cut-off	was	17	September,	except	for	data	on	export	markets	and	the	prices	of	competitors	in	
their	national	currencies,	which	were	taken	from	the	ECB	staff	macroeconomic	projections	for	the	euro	area,	September	2019,	which	
use information up to 19 August. 
3	 	A	further	difficulty	is	that	sector	accounts	consistent	with	the	annual	National	Accounts	and	the	preliminary	quarterly	results	have	still	
not been published.
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Cut-off date for assumptions: 17 September 2019. Figures expressed as levels are annual averages. Figures expressed as rates are calculated 
based on the relevant annual averages.
b Differences between rates for world output and export markets and between levels for oil prices and the dollar/euro exchange rate. Percentage 
differences for the effective nominal exchange rate and percentage point differences for interest rates.
c A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.
d For the projection period, the figures in the table are technical assumptions, prepared using the Eurosystem's methodology. These assumptions 
are based on futures market prices or on proxies thereof and should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem prediction as to the course of these 
variables.
2018 2019 2020 2021 2019 2020 2021
International environment
    World GDP 3.6 2.8 3.2 3.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
2.0-5.0-7.0-0.35.29.10.3stekram tropxe s'niapS    
8.4-8.5-1.4-9.750.060.461.17 )level( lerrab/rallod SU ni ecirp liO    
Monetary and financial conditions
20.0-20.0-10.0-01.101.121.181.1 )level( etar egnahcxe orue/rallod SU    
    Nominal effective exchange rate against non-euro area (c)
    (2000 = 100 and percentage differences)
121.5 116.4 115.1 115.1 -0.3 -1.1 -1.1
3.0-2.0-0.05.0-5.0-4.0-3.0-)d( )ROBIRUE htnom-3( etar tseretni mret-trohS    
0.1-9.0-5.0-6.04.06.04.1)d( )dleiy dnob raey-01( etar tseretni mret-gnoL    
Differences between 
September and
June 2019 projections (b)
September 2019 projections
Table 1
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (a)
Annual rates of change unless otherwise indicated
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and the assumption that, following their recent weakness, 
export markets will tend to recover gradually over the 
projection horizon. As a result of all this, it is expected that 
the growth rate of the economy will continue to enable the 
still high volume of unemployment to be reabsorbed.
Notwithstanding this, activity will tend to become less 
buoyant over the projection horizon. In terms of average 
annual rates, after growing by 2.4% in 2018, GDP is 
projected to grow by 2% in 2019, and by 1.7% in 2020 
and 1.6% in 2021. This profile of deceleration is partly a 
result of weaker domestic demand, revealed by the latest 
National Accounts data, and partly a consequence of the 
latest economic data available, which point to a weakening 
of activity over the summer months. Overall, this new 
information shows that the deterioration of the external 
environment and the uncertainties originating from the 
rest of the world (and possibly also other domestic ones) 
appear to be having a moderating impact on business 
and household spending. This context of greater 
uncertainty is expected to continue to weigh on agents’ 
spending decisions, particularly in the short term, leading 
to more moderate activity growth than in recent years.
Notable, in comparison with the June projections, are the 
significant changes made to three of the assumptions on 
which the projections are based. First, the expected 
dynamism of Spain’s export markets is now less than it 
was three months ago, especially in 2019 and 2020, as a 
result of the lower growth projected for the euro area and, 
especially, for the economies outside the euro area (see 
Table 1). The cumulative growth of external markets over 
Box 1
MACROECONOMIC	PROJECTIONS	FOR	SPAIN	(2019-2021)	(cont’d)
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
Latest QNA figure published: 2019 Q2.
a Projections cut-off date: 17 September 2019.
b Includes machinery, capital goods, weapons systems, cultivated biological resources and intellectual property products.
Differences between September 
and June 2019 projections
2018 2019 2020 2021 2019 2020 2021
1.0-2.0-4.0-6.17.10.24.2PDG
1.0-4.0-8.0-4.13.10.18.1noitpmusnoc etavirP
0.00.00.02.13.18.19.1noitpmusnoc tnemnrevoG
3.0-5.0-9.1-6.24.33.23.5noitamrof latipac dexif ssorG
    Investment in equipment, intangibles and other (b) 4.1 2.3 2.9 2.3 -1.4 -0.6 -0.3
3.0-4.0-3.2-9.29.33.26.6noitcurtsnoc ni tnemtsevnI    
2.0-2.0-6.03.30.32.22.2secivres dna sdoog fo stropxE
2.0-6.0-9.0-4.32.35.03.3secivres dna sdoog fo stropmI
2.0-4.0-9.0-5.17.14.17.2)htworg ot noitubirtnoc( dnamed citsemoD
0.02.05.01.00.06.03.0-)htworg ot noitubirtnoc( dnamed lanretxe teN
0.02.0-3.0-5.11.18.07.1)PCIH( secirp remusnoc fo xedni desinomraH
1.0-1.0-1.0-6.14.11.10.1doof dna ygrene gnidulcxe PCIH
1.0-2.0-2.0-5.13.18.15.2)sboj tnelaviuqe emit-lluf( tnemyolpmE
Unemployment rate (% of labour force).
End-of-period data 14.4 14.1 13.2 12.8 0.2 0.8 1.0
Unemployment rate (% of labour force).
Annual average 15.3 14.1 13.6 13.0 0.2 0.6 0.9
General government net lending (+) / net borrowing (-) (% of GDP) -2.5 -2.4 -1.8 -1.5 0.0 0.0 0.1
September 2019 projections
Table 2
PROJECTIONS FOR THE MAIN MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a) 
Annual rate of change in volume terms and % of GDP
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the whole of the time horizon considered has been revised 
downwards by 1.4 pp. Compared with the negative impact 
on activity that this change gives rise to, the other two 
changes work in the opposite direction. In particular, there 
has been a notable downward revision to the oil price, 
which boosts the growth of private agents’ real incomes. 
Also, the paths of interbank market interest rates and 
government debt yields are now considerably below 
those anticipated three months ago, which results in lower 
financing costs for the economy as a whole. This revision 
to the interest rates expected by the financial markets is 
explained by two main factors: the latest euro area activity 
and inflation data (which is less favourable than was 
anticipated three months ago); and the loosening of 
monetary policy in the United States and the new 
monetary stimulus measures adopted by the Governing 
Council of the ECB on 12 September.4
The changes in the fiscal policy assumptions for the 
projection horizon, relative to the June projections 
exercise, are of little significance. As in June, the fiscal 
policy forecasts incorporate the extension to 2019 of the 
2018 State and Social Security budgets, the measures 
approved by parliament before the April general elections,5 
the regional government and local government budgets 
approved for 2019, as well as the information available on 
the budget outturn. As regards the assumptions for the 
rest of the time horizon considered, the upcoming general 
elections make it practically impossible for the draft 
budget for 2020 to be presented in 2019. Also, as at the 
cut-off date for the projections, the new National Accounts 
time series for general government, to be published on 30 
September, were still not available. Accordingly, the 
projections take as their starting point the previously 
released 2018 data.
Against this background, when projecting the expected 
paths of certain budgetary items over the period 
2020-2021, certain technical assumptions have been 
made, as in the June projections. First, that the items 
subject to greater discretion, including notably, on account 
of their size, purchases of goods and services and public 
investment, will grow in line with the Spanish economy’s 
potential growth rate. Second, it is considered that the 
paths of the other items, making up the general 
government accounts will be determined, in the absence 
of additional measures, by their usual determinants. 
Specifically, it is assumed that public revenues will grow in 
line with the tax bases, which basically depend on the 
macroeconomic context. Similar assumptions have been 
made for less discretionary spending items, including 
spending on pensions (which is determined, along with 
the increases agreed for 2018-2019, by the revaluation 
formula established by law and by population ageing), 
unemployment benefits (the growth of which will depend 
basically on developments in unemployment) and interest 
(changes in which reflect the growth of government debt 
and the course of interest rates). This last item, in 
particular, has been revised down on account of the 
changes observed in market interest rates compared with 
the previous projections. In accordance with these 
assumptions, the fiscal policy stance will be expansionary 
in 2019, and approximately neutral over the following two 
years.6
The changes to the assumptions on which the projections 
are based have, overall, a neutral impact on GDP growth 
over the projection horizon. Specifically, the negative 
impact of the deterioration in external markets on activity 
is offset by the positive effect of lower financing costs and 
lower oil prices. Notwithstanding this, the information that 
has become available since June has led to a downward 
revision in the GDP growth rates projected over the 
projection horizon, in comparison with those published in 
June. This is a consequence of two types of factors. First, 
the revised National Accounts time series indicate that the 
Spanish economy’s resilience to the context of global 
uncertainty which began to gradually take hold last year is 
actually lower than estimated three months ago. Indeed, 
Box 1
MACROECONOMIC	PROJECTIONS	FOR	SPAIN	(2019-2021)	(cont’d)
4  See Section 3.2 of the main text for a detailed description of these measures.
5	 	Among	these	measures,	which	were	already	included	in	the	March	and	June	projections,	the	following	are	notable	for	the	size	of	
their	impact	on	spending:	(i) the	increase	in	pensions	in	2019	in	line	with	CPI	forecasts;	(ii) the	increase	in	public	sector	wages;	(iii) the	
progressive	extension	of	paternity	leave	to	8	weeks	this	year,	12	weeks	in	2020	and	16	weeks	in	2021;	and	(iv) the	reintroduction	of	
the	unemployment	benefits	for	the	over-52s.	As	regards	revenues,	the	projections	include	the	increases	in	the	minimum	(due	to	the	
increase	in	the	national	minimum	wage)	and	maximum	contribution	bases	(by	7%),	as	well	as	in	the	rates	for	self-employed	workers.
6	 	In	2018	and	in	2019,	a	number	of	temporary	measures	are	budgeted	(such	as	the	costs	of	the	insolvent	toll	motorways,	the	asset	
protection	schemes	and	deferred	fiscal	assets	of	banks,	and	the	judgement	on	the	exemption	of	maternity	and	paternity	benefits	
from	personal	income	tax),	with	a	rising	impact	on	the	budget	deficit	of	0.4%	and	0.3%	of	GDP,	respectively.
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Box 1
MACROECONOMIC	PROJECTIONS	FOR	SPAIN	(2019-2021)	(cont’d)
the new data show a profile of slowing activity (and, in 
particular, of slowing domestic demand) that is more 
pronounced than the one according to the previous time 
series. Second, the increase in global uncertainty over the 
summer months and the deterioration of the external 
setting (the recovery in which is expected to be postponed 
by several quarters) led to a downward revision to the 
growth anticipated in the second half of the year and, 
more modestly, over the rest of the forecast. As a result of 
all this, the GDP growth projected for 2019 has been 
revised down by 0.4 pp, the revision of National Accounts 
data and the less favourable economic developments 
since the spring and their effects on the short-term outlook 
having made contributions of approximately the same 
magnitude to this revision. The downward revisions in 
2020 and 2021 are of 0.2 pp and 0.1 pp, respectively. 
The projected GDP growth path is underpinned by a lower 
positive contribution of domestic demand than in the 
recent past. The rate of growth of the main domestic 
demand components has also been revised down, largely 
because it has eased recently. Thus, the more recent data 
reflect a slowdown in spending on consumer goods and 
services. This loss of dynamism may be connected to the 
heightened uncertainty. Going forward, growth in 
consumption is expected to be underpinned by labour 
market developments, which are expected to remain 
positive (despite feeling the impact of the recent 
slowdown), and by continuing favourable financing 
conditions. Private consumption growth has been revised 
down compared with the June projections. This is the 
result of the inclusion of the more recent information, not 
only on the new historical series but also on the recent 
less expansionary labour market performance. 
As regards the components of gross fixed capital 
formation, over the course of the projection horizon both 
residential and business investment are expected to be 
less dynamic than in recent years, against a backdrop of 
greater uncertainty, lower new plant capacity requirements 
and more moderate growth in the real estate market after 
years of recovery. In annual average terms, over the 3-year 
projection horizon analysed, both aggregates will record 
lower growth than forecast in June. The downward 
revision is especially marked for 2019 and is largely the 
result of the inclusion of the data on the latest quarters 
recently released by the INE. 
The average growth projection for exports in 2019 has 
been revised up. This is due to the inclusion of the new 
data series since, conversely, the heightened uncertainty 
and the weaker performance expected of the export 
markets suggest that in coming quarters sales abroad will 
be less robust than forecast three months ago. This 
deterioration in the external environment explains why 
export growth expectations have been revised down in 
the rest of the projection horizon. Import growth 
expectations over the projection horizon are also lower 
now than in June. This reflects both the import 
sluggishness observed in the latest quarters and the lower 
final demand momentum expected going forward.
The slower GDP growth forecast over the projection 
horizon will translate into a gradual decline in the pace of 
job creation, as has already been observed in the most 
recent employment indicators. In any event, the increase 
in employment will mean that the unemployment rate will 
continue to decline, although less markedly than expected 
in June. This is also a reflection of higher growth in the 
labour force owing to the higher population dynamism 
projected, which is in turn a consequence of the inclusion 
of the most recent information on net migration (see 
Box 5). The unemployment rate is now expected to fall to 
12.8% at the end of the projection horizon, 1 pp above the 
level forecast three months ago.
Inflation, measured as the year-on-year rate of change of 
the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP), is 
expected to rise over the projection horizon. This is a 
consequence of the decrease in the cyclical slack in the 
labour market, as a result of the continued economic 
expansion, which will drive up unit labour costs. The 
expansionary monetary policy stance will also contribute 
in the same direction. By contrast, the assumptions on 
which the projection exercise is based suggest that 
external inflationary pressure will decline in coming years, 
reflecting the downward path of oil prices. As a result of 
these combined effects, in annual average terms HICP 
growth is expected to rise gradually, from 0.8% in 2019 to 
1.5% in 2021. For its part, the rate of growth of core 
inflation – measured as the rate of change of the HICP 
excluding energy and food – will rise over the projection 
horizon, from 1.1% in 2019 to 1.6% in 2021. 
With all due caution, considering that budget deficit series 
consistent with the new national accounts series are not 
yet available, it is estimated that the general government 
budget balance in 2019 could be -2.4% of GDP. This would 
imply maintaining the deficit forecast for 2019 compared 
with the June projections, as it is estimated that the 
negative impact of the cyclical deterioration on public 
finances will be offset by the positive effect of lower 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 3/2019  QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
Box 1
MACROECONOMIC	PROJECTIONS	FOR	SPAIN	(2019-2021)	(cont’d)
interest rates, together with the additional effects deriving 
from certain non-recurring items and from the better than 
expected performance of some tax revenues.
The current HICP growth projections entail a downward 
revision of 0.3 pp in 2019 and 0.2 pp in 2020. Part of the 
reason for this is that, in the more recent months, energy 
prices and, to a lesser extent, prices of other goods have 
been less dynamic than expected in the previous 
projection exercise. Moreover, the levels projected for 
crude prices are now lower and the growth forecast for 
non-energy prices is more contained. The forecasts for 
2021 remain unchanged, as a result of two contrasting 
effects. On the one hand, the fall in crude prices expected 
in the futures markets has eased compared with that 
considered in the projection exercise three months ago. 
On the other hand, as in all the other years in the 
projection horizon, core inflation has been revised down 
by 1  pp owing to weaker demand and more moderate 
inflation expectations.
The risks to the central scenario for growth in activity 
remain on the downside. On the external front, as 
indicated, the near-term growth outlook for Spain’s 
export markets has been revised down, in accordance 
with the recent data on activity worldwide (and in 
particular in the euro area which is Spain’s main trading 
partner). The assumptions on future export market 
behaviour – taken from the latest ECB staff projections – 
assume that the recent adverse performance is temporary 
and that it will start to reverse in early 2020. However, if 
the recent weakening of activity proves to be more 
persistent than envisaged in the assumptions, the course 
of the Spanish economy would be less favourable than 
envisaged in the central scenario. Other sources of 
uncertainty are the possible adoption of new protectionist 
measures and the question marks over the form that 
Brexit will take. Lastly, the recent spike in oil prices 
following the attacks on Saudi production facilities is a 
reminder that latent geopolitical tensions can give rise to 
reductions in the oil supply, with the consequent negative 
impact on activity. On the domestic front, there is still a 
high degree of uncertainty over the future economic 
policy stance and the adoption of measures that will 
increase the resilience of the Spanish economy to a 
possible deterioration of the global macro-financial 
environment and boost its potential growth. In particular, 
there are few details on fiscal policy, in a setting in which 
the persistently high levels of government debt mean that 
Spanish public finances still have pockets of vulnerability 
to possible adverse shocks.
The risks of inflation departing from the central scenario 
are also on the downside, as a consequence of the 
hypothetical materialisation of the risks to activity 
described above. However, some of these risks also 
contain potential inflationary elements. For instance 
higher tariffs, which imply higher import prices at the 
different stages of the value chain and, therefore, could 
have an indirect effect on the prices of purchases made 
by the Spanish economy abroad, and also hypothetical 
oil price rises as a consequence of an increase in certain 
geopolitical tensions.
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This box is part of the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy” for 2019 Q3
Trade tensions between the United States and China, 
materialised in several rounds of bilateral tariff increases 
between the two countries in the latest quarters, seem to 
be significantly affecting global economic activity. In 
addition to the impact on bilateral trade flows between 
these two countries, these tensions appear to be affecting 
other countries through the fall in demand derived from 
lower global activity and as a result of the economic 
effects of greater global uncertainty (see Charts  1.1 
and 1.2). The persistence of this situation over time could 
also significantly increase the adverse effects, given the 
integration of the different economies in global trade 
Box 2
RISING	PROTECTIONISM	BETWEEN	THE	UNITED	STATES	AND	CHINA	AND	ITS	EFFECTS	ON	THE	GLOBAL	ECONOMY
SOURCES: Index of Ahir, Bloom and Furceri (2018), CPB, World Bank, European Central Bank and Banco de España.
a The index is constructed by analysing how frequently concepts linked to uncertainty and trade appear in analysts' reports.
b Intra-area trade is excluded for the euro area.
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
 United States China  Euro area  Rest of the
world
 World
4  SIMULATIONS: EFFECT ON GDP IN THE FOURTH QUARTER OF 2021
% of deviation from baseline scenario
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018
1  WORLD TRADE UNCERTAINTY INDEX (a)
Index
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
United States China Euro area
3  EXPOSURE TO EXPORTS (2017) (b)
% of GDP
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
910281027102
REST OF THE WORLD UNITED STATES
CHINA WORLD TRADE
2  WORLD TRADE
% 3-month moving average
Chart 1
RISING PROTECTIONISM HAS NOTICEABLE CONSEQUENCES ON GLOBAL ACTIVITY
The escalation of tariff-related tensions between the United States and China, both highly significant economies at the global level in terms 
of their share and high degree of interconnectedness, affects the activity of both countries and is transmitted to other countries through many 
real and financial channels.
 TARIFFS DECLARED/IMPOSED  UNTIL END 2019
 INCLUDING UNCERTAINTY EFFECT
 UNITED STATES (GOODS)  EURO AREA (GOODS)
 REST OF WORLD (GOODS) CHINA (GOODS)
TOTAL (GOODS AND SERVICES)
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through global value chains. This Box aims to summarise 
the developments in the trade conflict between the United 
States and China and to describe the main channels 
through which they seem to be affecting the world 
economy.
Several rounds of increases in tariffs on bilateral trade 
flows between the United States and China have been 
announced and applied since March 2018 (see Tables 1 
and 2). Over the course of 2018, the measures adopted by 
the two countries resulted in the imposition of trade tariffs 
on different types of goods accounting for around 45% of 
US imports from China and 55% of Chinese imports from 
the United States. Following a truce which commenced in 
December 2018, the escalation of bilateral tariff increases 
entered a new phase in May 2019. Since then, new 
decisions were made to increase tariffs, both on goods 
already affected by the measures adopted in 2018 and on 
other additional goods. As a consequence, all US imports 
from China and nearly three quarters of China’s purchases 
from the United States would be subject to tariffs at the 
end of this year, in accordance with the scheduled dates 
for entry into force of the different tariffs. In addition to the 
tariff measures, announcements have been made of 
possible restrictions to the exchange of technology, 
although no specific actions have yet been determined.
Rising protectionism between these two economies, 
which are the largest worldwide and are increasingly 
interconnected with each other and the rest of the world, 
might have a substantial impact on the world economy 
through numerous direct and indirect channels. A direct 
Box 2
RISING	PROTECTIONISM	BETWEEN	THE	UNITED	STATES	AND	CHINA	AND	ITS	EFFECTS	ON	THE	GLOBAL	ECONOMY	
(cont’d)
SOURCES: CEIC and Peterson Institute for International Economics.
a There are overlaps regarding goods subject to tariffs in other rounds and, consequently, only the additional effect on the percentage of imports 
subject to tariffs is shown.
Volume of
imports
($bn)
Cumulative % of imports 
from US subject to tariffs
Change since May 2019,
 projected date of entry into force
Products affected
strap rac ,stcudorp larutlucirgA–2243
tnempiuqe lacidem ,slairetam waR–2361
60 (a) 56 5-10% to 5-25% (1 Jun-19) Agricultural products, chemicals
New: 5-10% (1 Sept-19)
New: 5-10% (15 Dec-19)
75 (a) 71
Agricultural products, chemicals,
industrial machinery
TARIFFS IMPOSED BY CHINA ON THE UNITED STATES
Table 2
SOURCE: US Census Bureau.
Volume of
imports
($bn)
Cumulative % of 
imports from China 
subject to tariffs
Change since May 2019,
 projected date of entry into force
Products affected
34 6 25 to 30% (15 Oct-19) Machinery, capital goods
16 9 25 to 30% (15 Oct-19) Electrical equipment, capital goods
200 46 10 to 30% (15 Oct-19)
Furniture, electronics, cars, leather,
 other intermediate and capital goods
115 78 New: 15% (1 Sept-19) Clothing, footwear, electronic components
160 100 New: 15% (15 Dec-19) Mobile telephones, toys, computers
TARIFFS IMPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES ON CHINA
Table 1
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channel runs through changes in demand and in the 
relative prices of goods. Specifically, an increase in tariffs 
leads to the erosion of consumer disposable income, 
which negatively affects consumption and investment. 
Conversely, it also makes domestic production more 
attractive than imported production. In any event, if trade 
reprisals take place, external demand decreases. In the 
specific case of China and the United States, the effect 
arising from the fall in commodity prices as a result of the 
dominant position of the two countries in oil and industrial 
metals demand worldwide is especially significant. An 
additional direct mechanism is one which operates 
through cross-border financial positions (although the 
limited openness of China’s capital account restricts this 
channel’s potential). Indirect channels are related to rising 
uncertainty, which hampers consumer and business 
confidence, weakening consumption and investment. 
From a financial standpoint, they are related to an increase 
in risk aversion and a decline in asset valuations.
Based on the available data it is difficult to accurately 
estimate the specific impact which the different waves of 
tariff hikes may have had on global economic activity. This 
consideration particularly affects the latest actions 
announced within the escalation which started in May this 
year, since most of them have not yet come into force (they 
will in October and December) or have done so very 
recently (in September). To approximate the possible 
economic impact of these actions on global activity a 
simulation exercise using a macroeconometric model has 
been conducted.1 Specifically, the effect of the tariffs 
announced by the United States and China since May this 
year, regardless of whether they had been applied yet, was 
simulated. These measures affect all US imports from 
China and 71% of the reciprocal flow. Chart 1.4 shows two 
scenarios, reflecting the transmission channels described 
previously. The first scenario relates to the real direct 
channels, i.e. those which run through changes in bilateral 
trade between the two countries and the global effects of 
the second round owing to the decline in global demand. 
The second scenario also adds the possible effects arising 
from the fall in confidence and the increase in uncertainty. 
This channel is approximated through an ad hoc investment 
risk premium increase of 25  bp in the US and China 
combined with a 10 bp rise in the rest of  economies, a 
smaller shock than that seen in August this year.2, 3
According to the simulations, the increase in tariffs 
(scenario 1) would entail a significant contraction  in activity 
in the United States, China and also in the euro area, taking 
global GDP 0.25% below the baseline scenario in 
cumulative terms in 2019-2021, with declines in the GDP 
of the United States and China of 0.26% and 0.38%, 
respectively. The greater impact on the Chinese economy 
reflects the fact that the volume of imports subject to US 
tariffs as a share of China’s GDP is higher than the volume 
on which the Chinese authorities imposed tariffs in 
retaliation. GDP of the euro area is estimated to contract 
by 0.2%, reflecting its high degree of trade openness, 
which makes it more vulnerable to the fall in global activity 
(see Chart  1.3). The second scenario shows how the 
confidence effect could ultimately generate significant 
adverse impacts in relation to those arising from the real 
channels. This is not only due to the direct impact from 
higher investment risk premia  but also due to the second-
round effect on global activity, which has a considerable 
repercussion on the euro area. However, it is difficult to 
calibrate the effect of the trade war on uncertainty and, 
consequently, its impacts should be regarded with more 
caution than those of the real channels.4
Box 2
RISING	PROTECTIONISM	BETWEEN	THE	UNITED	STATES	AND	CHINA	AND	ITS	EFFECTS	ON	THE	GLOBAL	ECONOMY	
(cont’d)
1	 	Specifically,	the	NiGEM	model	of	the	British National Institute of Economic and Social Research. The documentation for the model 
is available at https://nimodel.niesr.ac.uk/.
2	 	The	magnitude	of	the	investment	risk	premia	shock	is	somewhat	lower	than	that	seen	in	reaction	to	those	recorded	in	the	corporate	
spreads	in	August	2019,	at	the	height	of	the	trade	tensions.
3	 	A	number	of	assumptions	are	used	in	the	simulation.	Specifically,	it	is	considered	that	expectations	are	rational,	monetary	policy	is	
exogenous	 and	 fiscal	 policy	 acts	 as	 an	 automatic	 stabiliser	 (simultaneously	maintaining	 a	medium-term	budgetary	 target).	 The	
monetary policy assumption is introduced to prevent the increase in imported goods prices from triggering an increase in interest 
rates	in	the	United	States,	as	this	would	be	contrary	to	the	Federal	Reserve’s	reaction.
4	 	The	simulations	show	effects	of	the	same	order	of	magnitude	as	other	studies,	although	they	are	not	directly	comparable	due	to	the	
different	nature	of	the	shocks	included.	In	the	World	Economic	Outlook	of	October	2018,	the	IMF	shows	impacts	on	the	pure	trade	
scenario	of	-0.3%	in	the	United	States	and	-0.6%	in	China	in	2021.	Also,	in	the	OECD’s	exercise	included	in	the	Economic Outlook 
of	April	2019,	the	impact	of	an	adverse	scenario	in	which	confidence	deteriorates	sharply	is	-0.8%	for	the	United	States	and	-1.2%	
for China in 2021.
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Nevertheless, there are several factors which could 
produce different effects to those considered in these 
simulations. First, the exercise undertaken does not take 
into account the expansionary reaction of monetary 
policies globally, which has already begun and would tend 
to reduce the magnitude of the impact. Second, trade 
tensions may lead to changes in the location of global 
production chains, in which China has a dominant 
position, affecting activity in third countries, positively or 
negatively, according to the case at hand, depending on 
its complementarity or substitutability with respect to 
China’s production. Another factor not considered in the 
simulations, given the limitations of the model used, is 
trade potentially being diverted to third economies, such 
as the euro area, which could benefit in terms of their 
exports of certain types of products and services.
Box 2
RISING	PROTECTIONISM	BETWEEN	THE	UNITED	STATES	AND	CHINA	AND	ITS	EFFECTS	ON	THE	GLOBAL	ECONOMY	
(cont’d)
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At the end of June, the European Union (EU) and the four 
Latin American countries which make up the MERCOSUR 
trading bloc (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) 
signed a historic trade agreement after 20 years of 
negotiations. The treaty – pending final wording and 
ratification1 – envisages the removal of tariffs on more 
than 90% of the trade in goods between the two areas 
and includes provisions which facilitate trade in services 
and the liberalisation of public procurement processes. 
Given its broad scope, the agreement is expected to 
notably boost bilateral trade and economic integration 
between the two regions. The treaty is also a sign of the 
EU’s commitment to maintaining free trade against a 
global setting of growing protectionist tensions. This box 
describes the main features of the agreement and 
discusses its scope from a sectoral standpoint.
Under the agreement, the MERCOSUR countries will 
remove the tariffs on 91% of the goods imported from the 
EU, which include key EU exports such as vehicles and 
machinery. In turn, the EU will liberalise 95% of the goods 
imported from MERCOSUR, including 82% of imports of 
agricultural products. Certain products such as meat and 
sugar, will be subject to a partial liberalisation. In general, 
tariffs will be reduced over a 10-year period from the 
ratification of the agreement. The agreement also includes 
some provisions, which reduce non-tariff barriers by 
simplifying customs procedures, and others, which 
facilitate trade in services through non-discrimination 
clauses against foreign companies. Likewise, the treaty 
envisages the liberalisation of public procurement 
processes by both parties. Thus, European firms will be 
the first non-MERCOSUR firms to have access to these 
processes on an equal footing with local firms; to date they 
could only participate through their subsidiaries.2 In line 
with the model of trade agreements imposed in recent 
years, the treaty also includes provisions for safeguarding 
the environment and labour standards, such as employees’ 
freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining 
and non-discrimination at work.
After China, the EU is currently MERCOSUR’s second 
most important trading partner and represents 20% of 
goods trade with the Latin American bloc. Trade with 
MERCOSUR only represents 2.2% of the EU’s trade in 
goods and services.3 Following the usual pattern in trade 
between developed and emerging economies, the EU has 
a comparative advantage over MERCOSUR (Chart 1.3) in 
the supply of higher technology content products, such 
as machinery, electrical products or chemicals, whereas 
the comparative advantage of the MERCOSUR countries 
lies in raw material or natural resource intensive goods 
such as livestock, minerals, food and crop products. That 
is reflected in the bilateral trade patterns between the two 
areas shown in Charts 1.1 and 1.2, together with current 
tariff levels on the different product types. As can be seen, 
whereas the Latin American bloc’s imports to the EU are 
concentrated in agricultural and food products, European 
exports to MERCOSUR mainly comprise chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, machinery, vehicles and electrical 
products which are currently subject to high tariffs. 
Although services are not shown in the chart, the EU is a 
net supplier of all types of services. 
The agreement is notably important for the EU in view of 
MERCOSUR’s high tariff barriers in key areas of bilateral 
trade. The size of the trade flows affected by the MERCOSUR 
treaty is similar to or slightly lower than that covered by the 
recent treaties entered into with Canada and Japan. 
However, in comparison with the latter, the MERCOSUR 
treaty will entail a much higher reduction in export costs 
since the decrease in tariffs under this agreement will be 
comparatively sharper for Europe’s main exports, according 
to European Commission estimates.4 In terms of the 
agreement’s effect on EU activity, certain available studies 
indicate that its long-term positive impact on activity is 
estimated to be between 0.1% and 0.3% of GDP.5
Box 3
THE	EU-MERCOSUR	TRADE	AGREEMENT	AND	ITS	IMPACT	ON	THE	EUROPEAN	ECONOMIES
1	 	The	agreement	must	be	approved	by	the	European	Parliament	and	probably	-	based	on	the	provisions	included	in	the	final	text	-	it	
must also be approved by the national parliaments of the states involved. (https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-mercosur-
association-agreement/agreement-explained/).
2	 	Firms	based	in	the	Latin	American	bloc	and	controlled	by	a	European	parent	company.
3	 	Europe’s	trade	balance	with	the	Latin	American	bloc	has	shown	a	slight	surplus	over	recent	years	(+0.02%	of	GDP	in	trade	in	goods	
in	2018	and	+0.08%	in	trade	in	services	in	2017).
4	 	The	European	Commission	calculates	that	the	MERCOSUR	agreement	would	save	around	€4 billion	in	terms	of	lower	tariffs.	This	
saving	was	estimated	to	be	lower	or	equal	to	€1 billion	for	the	agreements	with	Canada	and	Japan.
5	 	C.	Kirkpatrick,	and	C.	George	(2009).	“Trade	sustainability	impact	assessment	(SIA)	of	the	association	agreement	under	negotiation	
between	the	European	Community	and	MERCOSUR”.	Institute	for	Development	Policy	and	Management,	University	of	Manchester	
and	 A.	 Burrell,	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 “Potential	 EU-MERCOSUR	 free	 trade	 agreement:	 impact	 assessment.”	 Publications	 Office	 of	 the	
European Union.
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Chart  2.1 shows the EU economies which, in principle, 
could benefit most from the removal of the tariffs since 
they specialise in production in the sectors with a 
comparative advantage over MERCOSUR. Furthermore, 
they will stand to gain from substantial tariff cuts. 
Noteworthy among these countries are those specialising 
in chemicals, transport, machinery and electrical products. 
Additionally, European countries which are relatively more 
specialised in providing services could enjoy new growth 
opportunities in these markets (Chart 2.2).6
The MERCOSUR countries have, as mentioned, an 
advantage in the production of food, agricultural products 
Box 3
THE	EU-MERCOSUR	TRADE	AGREEMENT	AND	ITS	IMPACT	ON	THE	EUROPEAN	ECONOMIES	(cont’d)
6	 	The	analysis	does	not	include	tourism	services,	on	which	the	agreement	would	have	a	low	impact,	or	intellectual	property	rights,	
since	the	classification	of	the	TiVA	database	does	not	quantify	their	weight	in	GDP.
SOURCES: Eurostat, WTO, World Bank and Banco de España calculations.
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and minerals. Chart  2.3 shows, for the main European 
economies, the weight in GDP of sectors in which 
MERCOSUR has a comparative advantage, based on 
those sectors’ value added share in terms of EU final 
demand. The countries most exposed to competition 
from MERCOSUR would be those where the agricultural 
and food sectors have the highest weight, along with 
France, since beef production is considered to be a 
branch of the agricultural industry in which the Latin 
American bloc has a particularly high comparative 
advantage. 
However, the analysis performed solely on the basis of the 
comparative advantages shown underestimates the 
opportunities offered by the agreement in currently highly 
protected sectors in Latin America, such as textiles and 
footwear, which relatively specialised European economies 
Box 3
THE	EU-MERCOSUR	TRADE	AGREEMENT	AND	ITS	IMPACT	ON	THE	EUROPEAN	ECONOMIES	(cont’d)
SOURCES: Eurostat, Comtrade, OECD TiVA, IMF and Banco de España calculations.
a For Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, we omit the value added provided by road transport services, which foreseeably will not benefit from 
the agreement.
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such as Portugal, Italy and Spain7 could benefit from. In 
addition, the analysis does not take into account the 
potential advantages of this agreement for countries such 
as Spain and Portugal, based on other driving factors of 
trade such as cultural and linguistic ties.8 In fact, goods 
and services trade with the Latin American bloc represents 
4.5% of Spain’s trade, which is double the EU average, a 
characteristic it shares with Portugal, the other EU country 
to have a language in common with a MERCOSUR 
economy (Chart  2.4). Furthermore, of the European 
countries, Spain is currently the second most important 
service provider to the Latin American bloc. This puts 
Spain in a privileged position for taking advantage of the 
opportunities of this agreement, both commercially and 
as regards the provision of services and the participation 
in public procurement, although certain raw-material 
intensive sectors will experience greater competitive 
pressure.
Box 3
THE	EU-MERCOSUR	TRADE	AGREEMENT	AND	ITS	IMPACT	ON	THE	EUROPEAN	ECONOMIES	(cont’d)
7	 	The	value	added	by	these	industries	as	a	percentage	of	GDP	is	2.6%	in	Portugal,	1.9%	in	Italy	and	0.7%	in	Spain.
8	 	The	literature	supports	the	influence	of	these	factors	when	explaining	bilateral	trade	flows.	See,	for	example,	Bayer	et	al.	(2007),	
“Free	trade	agreements	in	the	Americas:	are	the	trade	effects	larger	than	anticipated?”	The	World	Economy.
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Euro area real estate markets have performed strongly in 
recent years which, among other factors, has been 
reflected in significantly higher house prices. The 
improvement in economic activity and, particularly, in 
labour market conditions has driven demand for residential 
assets. Likewise, the setting of very low interest rates has 
provided a further stimulus to housing demand as a 
consumer good - due to the improvement in affordability 
measures - and as an investment. Together with these 
demand factors, other supply or more structural factors, 
such as demographic ones, have also shaped the 
performance of house prices in certain countries.1
Box	4
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN HOUSE PRICES IN EURO AREA COUNTRIES
SOURCES: Bank for International Settlements, Eurostat and European Central Bank.
a Nominal data. Data referring to Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta are until 2018 Q4.
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1	 	See	ECB	(2018),	“The	state	of	the	housing	market	in	the	euro	area”,	Economic	Bulletin,	No.	7.	For	an	analysis	of	the	significance	of	
structural	and	 institutional	 factors	 in	an	 international	comparison,	see	N.	Geng	 (2018),	 “Fundamental	Drivers	of	House	Prices	 in	
Advanced Economies”.	Working	paper	18/164.	International	Monetary	Fund.	
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There are several reasons which make it advisable for 
economic policymakers to closely monitor real estate market 
dynamics. On one hand, the sector is highly significant for 
economic performance2 and it may give rise to risks to 
financial stability. In the specific case of Spain, the Banco de 
España performs regular monitoring in its financial stability 
reports and, in particular, to determine the countercyclical 
capital buffer. On the other, the path of prices and housing 
affordability conditions may have important social 
implications. This box focuses on recent developments in 
house prices and in credit in euro area countries.
Housing has appreciated by more than 18% in nominal terms 
in the euro area since 2014, as shown by Chart  1.1. This 
upward trend has been widespread, except for in Italy, Greece 
and Cyprus. In several euro area economies (such as 
Luxembourg, Austria and Belgium) prices have reached levels 
which are clearly higher than those before the crisis of 2008.
More recent data, however, point to a slight slowdown. 
House prices in the euro area grew by 4% year-on-year in 
2019 Q1, compared with an average year-on-year rate of 
4.8% in 2018. Nevertheless, house price growth remains 
robust in many countries and Italy is the only euro area 
member to post year-on-year declines in residential real 
estate values in the first quarter (0.8%). Thus, in the first 
quarter house prices increased by 9% year-on-year in 
Portugal, by 8% in the Netherlands and Slovenia, and by 
around 7% in Germany and Spain. They were clearly 
slowing down in some economies, such as Ireland and 
Austria, where the year-on-year increase stood at 
approximately 4% in the first quarter, following average 
gains of 10% and 7% during 2018. In terms of the average 
of the last four quarters, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Ireland and Slovenia exceeded year-on-year 
growth of 6% in real terms, which is the threshold used by 
the European Commission as an alert mechanism for 
examining the presence and gravity of imbalances in the 
real estate market (see Chart 2.1).3
Considering a longer time frame, clearly different situations 
can be seen across countries. For instance, in Italy, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Ireland and Greece house prices fell sharply 
during the crisis, by more than 40% in real terms in certain 
Box	4
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN HOUSE PRICES IN EURO AREA COUNTRIES (cont’d)
SOURCE: European Central Bank.
a The average of the year-on-year rates of the last four quarters available is considered.
b Estimates from four methods, two of them are based on the price-rent ratio and the price-income ratio. See, ECB (2011), "Tools for detecting a possible 
misalignment of residential property prices from fundamentals", Financial Stability Review, Box 3, June; and ECB (2015), "A model-based valuation metric 
for residential property markets", Financial Stability Review, Box 3, November. The data for Belgium and Cyprus relate to 2018 Q3.
RANGE OF ESTIMATES AVERAGE
2  ECB METRICS ON THE DEGREE OF HOUSING OVERVALUATION. 2018 Q4 (a)
AT
BE
CY
DE
EE
ES
FI
FR
GR EA
IE
IT
LT
LU
LV
MT
NL
PT
SI
SK
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
-20 -10 0 10 20 30 40
1  GROWTH OF REAL HOUSE PRICES AND VALUATION
%
%
G
ro
w
th
 o
f (
re
al
) h
ou
se
 p
ric
es
 (a
)
Overvaluation. ECB average indicator. 2018 Q4 (b)
Chart 2
HOUSE PRICES AND VALUATION METRICS
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
LU AT BE FR DE SI PT LV ES UEM NL SK FI MT EE IE IT CY GR LT
2	 	In	the	euro	area,	residential	investment	has	accounted	for	almost	6%	of	GDP	and	27%	of	gross	fixed	capital	formation	in	terms	of	
the	historical	mean	since	2000.	These	ratios	were	somewhat	lower	in	2018.	Furthermore,	housing	is	also	an	important	determinant	
of consumption via wealth effects and as loan collateral.
3	 	See	European	Commission	(2018),	Alert Mechanism Report 2019,	November	2018.
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cases (see Chart  1.2). After this adjustment, prices levels 
tended to stabilise in Greece and Italy, whereas in Spain, the 
Netherlands and Ireland they once again followed an upward 
path, which was particularly steep in Ireland. In the second 
group of economies, which includes France, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, house prices corrected more moderately 
during the crisis even though they appreciated considerably 
before 2008. As a result, prices have reached very high levels 
in some of these countries. Lastly, there is a third group of 
economies, which includes Germany, Austria and Portugal, 
where the appreciation of housing since 2014 was not 
preceded by strong pre-crisis price increases.
According to the various analyses available, house prices 
in some countries are showing signs of being overvalued 
with respect to their equilibrium levels.4 In the case of 
Box	4
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN HOUSE PRICES IN EURO AREA COUNTRIES (cont’d)
SOURCES: Eurostat and European Central Bank.
a Expressed in real terms by using consumption deflator for household loans and house prices.
b Data referring to 2019 Q1. Loan growth expressed in terms of year-on-year rate of change.
c Renegotiated loans are excluded because they do not involve additional contributions of funds.
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4	 	For	a	description	of	the	various	methodologies,	see	ECB (2011),	“Tools for detecting a possible misalignment of residential property 
prices from fundamentals”,	Financial Stability Review,	June;	and	ECB (2015),	“A model-based valuation metric for residential property 
markets”,	Financial Stability Review, November.
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Spain, the Banco de España’s estimates indicate that 
average house prices are not far off their equilibrium 
value.5 Assessing the level of house prices with respect to 
their fundamentals, their equilibrium levels or certain 
historical benchmarks is surrounded by major uncertainty, 
as shown by the different results of the various 
methodological approaches (see Chart 2.2). Furthermore, 
national estimates may conceal contrasting situations in 
regional or local housing markets.6 This type of indicators, 
as part of a broader analysis which also included an 
analysis of developments in lending, in 2016 led the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to issue warnings 
on medium-term vulnerabilities in the residential real 
estate sector in eight EU countries,7 including Austria, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland and the Netherlands in the 
euro area.
A characteristic of the current expansionary cycle of 
house prices and of economic activity in the euro area is 
that it has been accompanied by more moderate growth 
of mortgage lending than that suggested by past historical 
patterns (see Chart 3.1). Despite the setting of historically 
low interest rates, the deleveraging process in certain 
countries is constraining the increase in the stock of credit 
(see Chart  3.2). Specifically, insofar as developments in 
this variable are determined by new loans and by 
repayments, a high volume of repayments could be 
masking the vigour of new loans. In fact, if the volume of 
new loans for house purchase is considered in isolation, it 
can be seen that loan origination has been more buoyant 
across the board since 2015 (see Chart 3.3). However, in 
more highly indebted countries or in those which have 
recently undergone deleveraging processes such as the 
Netherlands, Cyprus, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, the 
increase in new loans has not resulted in a significant rise 
in the aggregate stock of debt in the sector.
In short, the real estate market in the euro area is 
performing strongly with sustained price rises in numerous 
countries. These developments justify, particularly in the 
current low interest rate setting, authorities having to 
monitor the performance of the residential property 
market, given its close ties to the economic cycle and the 
credit cycle, and its social implications. This has already 
led to several countries applying macroprudential 
measures.8
Box	4
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN HOUSE PRICES IN EURO AREA COUNTRIES (cont’d)
5  See the Financial	Stability	Report,	Spring	2019.	See	specifically	Chart	1.4.B.
6	 	See	ECB	(2017),	“Residential real estate prices in capital cities: a review of trend”,	Box	3.	Financial	Stability	Review,	May
7	 	See	ERSB	(2016),	“Vulnerabilities	in	the	EU	residential	real	estate	sector”,	November.	
8	 	See	ERSB	(2019),	“A review of Macroprudential Policy in the EU in 2018”,	April.
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According to the latest Spanish population figures 
published by the INE (National Statistics Institute), the 
population resident in Spain at 1 January 2019 was slightly 
above 46.9 million, somewhat more than 100,000 above 
the previous high reached in 2012. This represents an 
annual increase of nearly 280,000 people and, 
consequently, the annual growth rate rose to 0.6% from 
0.3% a year earlier, continuing the trend of mild recovery 
seen in previous years (see Chart 1). This population 
increase exceeded that envisaged in the INE’s latest 
projections of October 2018 (0.4%) and was due 
exclusively to the rise in the numbers of foreign nationals. 
This population group increased by 290,000 in 2018, its 
growth rate rose to 6.3% and its relative weight in the total 
population moved above 10%, up 0.5% on the previous 
year.
The high migrant flows in 2018 counteracted the 
deterioration in the natural increase, defined as the 
difference between the number of births and the number 
of deaths (see Chart 2). This statistic was negative for the 
second consecutive year, exceeding 50,000 as a result of 
fewer births (-6.2% with respect to 2017, to 369,302, 
approaching the historical low of 1996) and a slight 
increase in deaths (0.4%). In particular, immigrant inflows 
increased by 21%, and this, combined with a drop of 16% 
in outflows with respect to the previous year, made for a 
Box 5
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POPULATION OF SPAIN
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Data relating to 1 January of each year.
b Defined as the population over 64 years of age divided by that between 16 and 64.
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net inflow which more than doubled that of 2017 to stand 
above 330,000, a level similar to that of 2008, after the 
sharp falls in net inflows during the crisis period (see Chart 
3). These figures surprised by being around 80,000 higher 
than the INE’s latest (October 2018) population projections, 
due to higher-than-expected inflows and to lower 
outflows.
By contrast, the number of nationals diminished slightly 
(by around 9,000). This was the result of two opposing 
forces. First, the negative natural increase exceeded 
100,000 (it was thus twice as large as that for the total 
population, which includes both nationals and foreigners). 
Second, this factor was almost offset by the increase in 
new additions of Spanish nationality (nearly 100,000 
against 26,000 in 2017). In all, this demographic 
development prolonged the process of progressive ageing 
of the population in Spain and raised the dependency 
rate, defined as the population over 64 years of age 
divided by that between 16 and 64, to 29.9%, nearly 6 pp 
above that in 2008 (see Chart 4).
Given the key role of migrant flows in explaining recent 
changes in the population, we analyse below in more 
detail the destination and origin of these flows. Regarding 
the destination of immigrant inflows, in absolute terms 
Catalonia, Madrid, Andalusia and the region of Valencia 
accounted for the bulk of inflows in 2018, although in 
relative terms, i.e. expressed as a proportion of the 
population of each region, the Balearic and Canary Islands 
Box 5
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POPULATION OF SPAIN (cont’d)
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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received immigrant inflows similar to those of Catalonia 
and Madrid. Chart 5 shows that immigrant inflows took 
place in regions which already had a higher percentage of 
foreign population. This is normal because of the 
importance of network effects in the determination of 
migrant flows.1 Also in line with what might be expected, 
economic factors seem to have played a role in attracting 
immigrants, such that immigrant flows have tended to be 
to regions with higher employment growth (see Chart 6) 
and, although here the relationship is not so clear, with 
lower unemployment rates. In addition, the concentration 
of foreign workers in the services sector meant that 
immigrant inflows preferentially targeted the regions most 
active in this sector.
The most recent Spanish Labour Force Survey data, 
relating to the second quarter, show that the dynamism of 
the foreign population continues, with an increase of 
7.1%, slightly above the growth of 6.2% observed at the 
end of 2018. 
Regarding the source of these immigrant flows, the 
recent rise in inflows has been accompanied by some 
changes in their composition by country of origin with 
respect to that observed during the crisis period. Thus, 
during the economic recovery initiated in 2014, the 
relative weight of the inflows from Latin American 
countries rose from 17.5% of total inflows in 2014 to 
31.7% in 2018 (see Chart 7). Most notable in this respect 
was the increase of around 6 pp in the relative weight of 
the flows from Colombia (to 9.5%) and Venezuela (to 
8.4%). Smaller increases occurred in the flows from 
Central American and African countries. By contrast, the 
relative weight of inflows of immigrants from EU countries 
fell by nearly 12 bp to 25.9%. Notable in this case was 
the decline by more than 6 pp in the relative weight of 
inflows from Romania, although it continues to be one of 
the main sources of immigrant flows. These recent 
changes in the distribution of inflows by country have not 
given rise to significant changes in the composition by 
educational level of immigrant arrivals, since those with 
intermediate educational attainment remain the largest 
group, although notably the proportion of those with a 
lower educational level has fallen over the last 10 years 
(see Chart 8).
Box 5
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POPULATION OF SPAIN (cont’d)
1	 	See,	 for	example,	M.	 Izquierdo,	A.	Lacuesta	and	J.	F.	Jimeno	(2016),	Spain:	 from	massive	 immigration	to	vast	emigration?,	 IZA	
Journal	of	Migration,	vol.	5(1),	for	an	analysis	of	the	determinants	of	migrant	flows	in	Spain.
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The labour force participation rate for young people under 
30 years of age in Spain declined significantly after the 
crisis, from around 70% in 2007 to 53% in 2019 Q2. 
Charts 1.1 and 1.2 show that the decline for this population 
group was different from that of other, older groups, and 
also that the lower participation rate among young people 
affected men and women alike. Thus, according to the 
Spanish Labour Force Survey conducted by the National 
Statistics Institute (INE, by its Spanish abbreviation), the 
participation rate for men under 30 years of age decreased 
from 72.2% in 2007 Q2 to 56.5% in the same period of 
2019, while that of women in the same age group fell from 
63.4% to 51.8%1.
In terms of quarter-to-quarter flows, the decline in the 
participation rate was due both to the lower number of 
young people joining the labour force and to the higher 
number of people aged under 30 becoming economically 
Box 6
CHANGES	IN	THE	YOUTH	LABOUR	FORCE	PARTICIPATION	RATE	AFTER	THE	CRISIS
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a As a percentage of the source population. Average for four quarters. Own calculations drawing on Spanish Labour Force Survey microdata. Men 
and women.
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1	 	Within	the	population	under	30	years	of	age,	the	decline	in	the	labour	force	participation	rate	was	sharper	for	those	aged	18	and	19	
(almost	20	pp).	It	was	also	notable	among	20	to	24-year	olds	(around	10	pp),	but	remained	largely	unchanged	for	the	group	aged	
between 25 and 29.
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inactive, in contrast with other age groups. Thus, activity 
inflows of young people decreased from 20.7% in 2008 to 
16.5% in 2014, compared with the increase observed in 
the population aged 30 and over (see Charts 1.3 y 1.4). 
During the recovery, from 2014 on, activity inflows have 
remained virtually unchanged, standing at 15.9% in 2019 
Q2. In turn, outflows of young people from the active 
population during the crisis rose from 8.3% in 2008 to 
9.2% in 2014, contrasting with the fall in the outflow rate 
among older people. In recent years, with the recovery, 
not only has this upward trend among young people not 
been checked, but it has continued to rise, reaching 
10.4% in 2019 Q2.
During the crisis, the majority of young people who 
decided to delay joining the labour market or to abandon 
it because of the difficulties encountered in finding 
employment, did so in order to further their education. 
Chart 2.1 shows that the percentage of economically 
inactive young people in education rose from 25.3% in 
2007 to 38.7% in 2018. The fewer job opportunities in the 
wake of the crisis have led to a decline in the percentage 
of people aged under 30 in employment. However, the 
proportion of those who are not in education, employment 
or training has decreased considerably since the end of 
the crisis. Specifically, the number of people under 30 
years of age who neither study nor work has fallen by 
more than 600,000, from the record high of 1.7 million 
reached in 2012, and by 17,000 compared with 2007 (see 
Chart 2.2). The temporary rebound observed during the 
recession in the number of young people who neither 
study nor work was due to the rise in the number of young 
people who had abandoned their studies during the 
expansionary period (1995-2007) and who became 
unemployed during the crisis (see Chart 2.2)2. However, 
the level and percentage of young people who are 
Box 6
CHANGES	IN	THE	YOUTH	LABOUR	FORCE	PARTICIPATION	RATE	AFTER	THE	CRISIS	(cont’d)
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Own calculations drawing on Spanish Labour Force Survey microdata. Considering both formal and non-formal education. Students on holiday are 
classed as students. Young people aged 16 to 30.
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Chart 2
YOUNG POPULATION: STRUCTURE AND CHANGES VIS-À-VIS THE LABOUR MARKET AND EDUCATION (a)
2	 	With	respect	to	the	rise	in	the	percentage	of	young	people	who	failed	to	obtain	a	lower	secondary	school	qualification	during	the	
expansionary	phase,	see	A.	Lacuesta	and	A.	Regil (2013),	“Desempleo	juvenil	y	cambios	en	las	pautas	de	formación	de	los	jóvenes	
sin	 empleo”,	 Box	 1	 in	 “La	 evolución	 del	 empleo	 y	 del	 paro	 en	 el	 año  2012,	 según	 la	 Encuesta	 de	 Población	 Activa”,	Boletín 
Económico,	Banco	de	España,	February 2013.
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economically inactive and not in education have remained 
relatively stable in the last 15 years, even during the crisis 
period.
The increased length of time young people spend on 
schooling has been accompanied by an improvement in 
their level of educational attainment (Chart 3.1), but this 
has not had an impact on the early school leavers’ rate, 
which remains high, albeit much lower than in the past3. 
To illustrate the improvement in the educational level, 
Chart 3.1 compares the highest level attained by the 
population aged 25 in different generations4. As can be 
observed, the percentage of young people whose highest 
level of educational attainment would have been a lower 
secondary school qualification by the age of 25 fell from 
36.5% to 23.3% between 2007 Q2 and the same period in 
20195. Most of the decline was almost exclusively 
accounted for by an increase in the percentage of young 
people obtaining a university degree (from 23.1% to 
33.9%), while the proportion of those successfully 
completing other types of tertiary education rose from 
11.5% to 15.9%.
In general, having an academic qualification leads the 
better job opportunities. As Chart 3.2 shows, although the 
participation rates of those whose highest level of 
educational attainment is a lower secondary school 
qualification are comparatively high in the early years of 
employment, their working life tends to be shorter, affecting 
the overall income obtained. There are also differences in 
terms of unemployment rates and average remuneration. 
For example, drawing on data from the Spanish Labour 
Force Survey, it can be observed that, on average, the 
unemployment rate of persons aged between 25 and 30 in 
2019 Q2 was 34% for those who only had a lower 
secondary qualification, but only 15% for university 
Box 6
CHANGES	IN	THE	YOUTH	LABOUR	FORCE	PARTICIPATION	RATE	AFTER	THE	CRISIS	(cont’d)
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Own calculations drawing on Spanish Labour Survey microdata. The participation rate of young people with a university education is not 
considered before the age of 20, owing to its unpredictability. “Low level”: no education, or only primary education or lower secondary with or 
without qualifications; “Mid-level vocational training and other” requires a lower secondary education qualification.
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YOUNG PEOPLE BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION AT THE AGE OF 25, AND PARTICIPATION RATE BY AGE IN 2018 ACCORDING TO LEVEL
OF EDUCATION (a)
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3	 	According	to	Eurostat,	the	early	school	leavers’	rate	for	students	aged	between	18	and	24 was	17.9%	in	2018	(11%	in	the	euro	
area),	compared	with	30%	in	2007.
4	 	The	age	chosen	is	25	years,	to	consider	students	who	have	completed	the	first	cycle	of	tertiary	education.
5	 	See	 A,	 Lacuesta,	 S.	 Puente	 and	 E.	 Villanueva  (2012),	 “The	 Schooling	Response	 to	 a	 Sustained	 Increase	 in	 Low-Skill	Wages: 
Evidence from Spain 1989-2009”,	Working	Paper	no. 1208,	Banco	de	España.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 35 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 3/2019  QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
graduates and 18% for groups with other higher education 
qualifications.
In short, the present recovery seems to be underpinned 
by a pattern that does not encourage young people to 
leave the education system, unlike that observed during 
the previous expansionary phase. The current decline in 
the labour force participation rate for young people might 
be offset in the future by an increase in the labour force 
participation and productivity of this generation.
Box 6
CHANGES	IN	THE	YOUTH	LABOUR	FORCE	PARTICIPATION	RATE	AFTER	THE	CRISIS	(cont’d)
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Between 2007 and 2013 the non-financial corporations 
sector underwent a severe crisis, which prompted 
considerable deterioration in their activity, profit and 
employment levels. Six years after the end of the 
downturn, this box compares the sector’s present 
situation with both the pre-crisis and peak-crisis levels. 
The analysis concentrates on corporate profitability, as 
this variable is a good indicator not only of firms’ 
economic and financial situation but also of their 
resilience to adverse shocks and their propensity to 
invest. The exercise draws on the Integrated Central 
Balance Sheet Data Office Survey (CBI), which has data 
up to 2017 for more than 600,000 non-financial 
corporations, and on the Central Balance Sheet Data 
Office Quarterly Survey (CBQ) which provides more 
recent data (up to June 2019) for a more limited sample 
(800 to 1,000 firms) where large corporations are over-
represented. The measure of profitability used is the 
ordinary net profit to equity ratio.1
The CBI data show that return on equity in the corporate 
sector fell sharply as a result of the crisis, down from 
14.5% on average in the period 2003 to 2007 to 5.2% in 
2013 (see Chart  1). The indicator then started to rise 
gradually in line with the macroeconomic recovery, 
reaching 9.7% in 2017 (the last year for which CBI data 
are available). The breakdown by firm size shows that 
profitability patterns at large corporations and at SMEs 
are similar to the patterns for the sector overall, although 
large corporations consistently record higher profitability 
levels than small firms.
However, the breakdown by sector reveals an uneven 
profitability recovery. Thus in 2017 profit levels in industry, 
in wholesale and retail trade and accommodation and 
food service activities and in transport and storage were 
similar to or higher than those of the period 2003 to 2007. 
Yet in construction, where profitability was negative in 
2013, in 2017 it was still very distant from the pre-crisis 
level. Lastly, both the energy and the information and 
communications sectors recorded a sharp decline in 
profitability up to 2013, not only as a consequence of the 
crisis but also on account of the impact of the growing 
competition in both areas. This last factor continued to 
affect both sectors in the subsequent recovery and this is 
why, conversely to the other sectors, their average 
profitability levels continued to fall, albeit much less 
markedly, up to 2017. 
An analysis of profitability distribution shows that between 
2003 and 2007 the percentage of firms recording positive 
returns rose, reflecting the growth in the period (see 
Chart 2). Subsequently, as was to be expected, in 2013 a 
shift is observed in the distribution towards lower levels 
compared with the pre-crisis situation. This is explained 
both by the increase in the percentage of firms recording 
negative returns and the decrease in the percentage of 
firms with profitability levels over  10%. Following the 
recovery, the profitability distribution again shifted to the 
right. However, compared with the pre-crisis situation, in 
2017 there is a greater concentration of firms with positive 
albeit moderate profitability levels, while the percentage 
of firms with relatively high profitability levels (over 10%) is 
lower than in 2007. Irrespective of the average level of 
corporate profitability in 2017, the fact that the distribution 
shows a very significant percentage of firms with relatively 
low (albeit positive) profitability would suggest that a 
considerable proportion of the companies analysed might 
still be quite sensitive to a possible adverse macro-
financial shock. 
It is also useful to examine the contribution made by the 
various different components of Ordinary Net Profit (ONP), 
which is the numerator of the profit ratio considered here. 
In this respect, Chart 3 shows that Gross Operating Profit 
(GOP) is the most important component underpinning the 
patterns observed, having made the largest contribution 
both to the decline in profitability during the crisis and to 
its subsequent recovery. There are, however, two 
additional elements that might also help explain the 
developments in return on equity. First financial costs, 
which fell as a proportion of total ONP over the period 
analysed, especially in the SME segment, owing to the 
deleveraging undertaken in the sector in recent years and, 
in particular, to the successive declines in interest rates in 
the period. And second, the significant increase in equity 
(the denominator) between 2007 and 2013, which drove 
down profitability in the period, most markedly among 
large corporations and in certain specific sectors (energy, 
construction, and information and communications). This 
increase in equity would be explained, inter alia, by 
significant capital increases made (for instance, through 
corporate debt to equity swaps) and by increases in 
reserves (arising, for example, from changes to dividend 
distribution policies or from extraordinary profits linked to 
investments in financial assets).
Box	7
PROFITABILITY	OF	SPANISH	NON-FINANCIAL	CORPORATIONS
1	 	The	results	obtained	using	alternative	measures	of	profitability,	such	as	return	on	net	assets,	are	consistent	with	those	obtained	here.	
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Box	7
PROFITABILITY	OF	SPANISH	NON-FINANCIAL	CORPORATIONS	(cont’d)
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Return on equity is defined as Ordinary net profit / Equity.
b Definition of firm size as per Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC.
c Pre-crisis profitability calculated as the GVA weighted average of profitability levels in the years 2003 to 2007.
d Excludes all firms with equity less than or equal to zero.
e Profitability for 2019 corresponds to H1, annualised to facilitate comparison with the previous years.
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Lastly, drawing on CBQ data, we analyse how corporate 
profitability has evolved in the more recent period.2 These 
data show that, for the quarterly sample as a whole, 
average profitability levels continued to grow in 2018, 
before falling slightly in 2019 on data to June (see Chart 4). 
The main reason for this decline in profitability in recent 
months appears to be the deterioration in operating activity 
in the period, against a backdrop of economic slowdown, 
prompting a widespread drop in Gross Operating Profit in 
all the main sectors covered by the quarterly sample, with 
the exception of energy which is the only sector that shows 
a somewhat more expansionary pattern.
Box	7
PROFITABILITY	OF	SPANISH	NON-FINANCIAL	CORPORATIONS	(cont’d)
2	 	The	profitability	levels	reflected	in	the	CBQ	and	the	CBI	are	not	directly	comparable,	either	in	terms	of	totals	or	breakdown	by	sector,	
owing	to	the	lower	number	of	firms	reporting	to	the	CBQ	and	the	over-representation	of	large	corporations.	However,	the	CBQ	is	
useful	to	assess	more	recent	corporate	profitability	patterns.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 39 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 3/2019  QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
This box describes the main characteristics of the 
review of Annual National Accounts (ANA) for the years 
1995-2018 published by the National Statistics Institute 
(INE) on 16 September 2019.1 These benchmark reviews 
are carried out at least every five years and respond to 
the need to periodically update the sources and methods 
of estimation used to compile the Annual National 
Accounts.2 In this case, the complete ANA series since 
1995, which is the reference year, have been reviewed. 
The review of the series corresponding to the main ANA 
aggregates has been released to date. At the same time, 
a first update of the Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) 
Box 8
REVIEW	OF	ANNUAL	NATIONAL	ACCOUNTS	FOR	1995-2018:	MAIN	AGGREGATES
1	 	The	review	was	conducted	in	coordination	with	the	corresponding	processes	carried	out	by	the	Banco	de	España	(on	the	Financial	
Accounts	for	the	Institutional	Sectors	of	the	Spanish	economy	and	the	Balance	of	Payments	and	International	Investment	Position	
statistics)	and	by	the	National	Audit	Office	(IGAE)	(on	the	General	Government	accounts).	The	data	provided	are,	therefore,	consistent	
with those provided by these other bodies. 
2	 	For	more	details	see	the	INE’s	press	release	published	on	16	September	2019:	“Annual	National	Accounts	of	Spain:	Main	aggregates.	
Statistical	 Review	 2019.	 Series	 1995-2018”.	 On	 benchmark	 reviews	 and	 their	 implications	 for	 the	 balance	 of	 payments	 and	
international	investment	position,	and	for	the	financial	accounts,	see	the	following	notes:	https://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/
infoest/htmls/notamet/revBPPII2019_en.pdf and https://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/htmls/notamet/revCCFF2019.pdf 
(the	latter,	on	financial	accounts,	only	available	in	Spanish).
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series, consistent with the revised annual series, was 
released. However, these quarterly data are provisional; 
the revised series will be released on 30 September.3 
These series will be consistent with the quarterly 
Balance of Payments and International Investment 
Position data to be released by the Banco de España on 
26 September.4
As a result of this review, nominal GDP in 2018 is 0.5% 
lower than the previous estimate. The reason for this is the 
less positive performance of real GDP. Specifically, the 
annual rate of growth of this variable is revised down 
somewhat on average, which translates into a cumulative 
decrease in its level since 1995 of 1.3 pp (see Chart 1 and 
Table 1). With the new series, the decline in GDP during 
Box 8
REVIEW	OF	ANNUAL	NATIONAL	ACCOUNTS	FOR	1995-2018:	MAIN	AGGREGATES	(cont’d)
3	 	In	accordance	with	the	INE’s	release	calendar,	both	the	Quarterly	National	Accounts:	Main	aggregates	(QNA)	and	the	Quarterly	Non-
Financial	Accounts	for	the	Institutional	Sectors	(QNFAIS)	up	to	2019	Q2	will	be	published	on	30	September.	The	Aggregates	by	
Branch	of	Activity	series	and	the	Non-Financial	Annual	Accounts	for	the	Institutional	Sectors	series	will	be	released	on	that	date.	The	
Supply	and	Use	tables	for	2016	will	be	published	in	November	2019	and	the	Input-Output	tables	for	2016	in	December	2019.
4	 	The	revision	of	the	Financial	Accounts	will	be	released	on	15	October.
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the crisis is somewhat smoother. Similarly, the momentum 
in activity during the current upturn is also tempered, 
except in 2015 where there is an upward revision of 
0.2  pp. Subsequently, GDP growth is revised down by 
between 0.1 pp and 0.2 pp in each of the following three 
years, giving rise to a more marked slowdown in the 
recent profile. In 2018 in particular real GDP growth is 
reduced by 0.2 pp to 2.4%. 
Over the period as a whole, the revision of aggregate 
employment (in terms of full-time equivalent jobs) is in the 
same direction as, but more marked than, the revision of 
GDP, resulting in a cumulative reduction since 1995 of 
3.6 pp. In the current growth phase, the downward revision 
is more pronounced in 2015 and 2016 than in later years.
The ANA revisions are most marked at the level of the 
demand components. The more moderate rate of growth 
of real GDP in the period as a whole is the result of a lower 
contribution of domestic demand, owing to lower than 
previously estimated growth in both gross capital 
formation and government consumption. Conversely, 
between 1995 and 2018 private consumption increases, 
despite the downward revision made in the last years of 
the series. The revisions of the contribution of domestic 
demand show a similar time pattern to the revision of GDP 
(with a smaller decline during the crisis and lower 
momentum in the current upturn). The lower average 
contribution of domestic demand is partially offset by a 
generally higher contribution of net external demand, 
during the crisis and in the subsequent upturn.
In the more recent period, the part played by domestic 
demand in underpinning the GDP growth path is smaller 
than suggested by the previous ANA data. Specifically, 
the downward revision of the rate of growth of GDP in 
2016 and 2018 reflects a smaller contribution of domestic 
demand, which is partially offset by the improved 
contribution of the external sector.  
Box 8
REVIEW	OF	ANNUAL	NATIONAL	ACCOUNTS	FOR	1995-2018:	MAIN	AGGREGATES	(cont’d)
SOURCE: INE and Banco de España.
a In brackets, the share of each component in GDP in accordance with the new series.
b Contributions to growth.
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In recent years, both private and government consumption 
performed less favourably than had been estimated to 
date, especially in 2018. The revisions to gross capital 
formation are larger and more volatile. Thus the most 
marked increase in this aggregate in 2015 is reversed on 
account of a sharper slowdown, in the same amount, in 
2016. In the last two years of the period analysed, the rate 
of growth of gross capital formation is revised up, 
especially in 2018. 
Regarding transactions with the rest of the world, the 
improvement in the contribution of net external demand in 
2015 and 2016 reflects somewhat higher growth in exports 
of goods and services, and especially a downward revision 
in the rate of growth of purchases abroad. In 2017, the 
higher increase in purchases abroad explains the 
deterioration in the contribution of the external sector in that 
year. Lastly, the rates of growth of trade transactions in 2018 
are revised down, most markedly in the case of imports, 
resulting in a larger contribution of the external sector. 
Box 8
REVIEW	OF	ANNUAL	NATIONAL	ACCOUNTS	FOR	1995-2018:	MAIN	AGGREGATES	(cont’d)
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The increased geopolitical uncertainty and doubts regarding economic 
activity prompted sharp declines in sovereign debt yields and bouts of 
volatility in the stock markets, leading the main central banks to adopt 
new expansionary measures
Volatility	in	the	international	financial	markets	increased	across	the	board	in	
Q3.	Financial asset prices fluctuated, mainly depending on the degree of optimism 
among investors about the outcome of the US-China trade talks, the changes in 
certain activity indicators, and the geopolitical uncertainty associated, for example, 
with Brexit, the stability of the Italian government or the recent tensions in the Middle 
East.
Equity	markets	remained	on	an	upward	path	until	end-July,	but	fell	sharply	in	
the	first	half	of	August.	The positive performance of world stock markets in June 
continued during most of July, enabling some of the main international indices, such 
as those of the US stock markets, to reach annual highs in this period. However, 
between the end of July and the first half of August, the widespread increase in 
investors’ aversion to risk led to sharp declines in stock indices. Share prices have 
subsequently started to recover, mainly because of the improved outlook regarding 
the future course of the US-China trade talks. As a result, at the cut-off date of this 
report, the stock indices of the main advanced economies (with the exception of 
United Kingdom), stood at levels that were higher than at end-Q2 (see Chart 2.1). By 
contrast, emerging stock markets declined across the board in the quarter, with a 
worse relative performance of Latin American markets.
In	 the	sovereign	debt	markets,	 long-term	yields	fell	 to	all-time	 lows	 in	most	
euro	area	countries	and	in	the	US. Sovereign debt yields fell sharply across the 
board for most of the quarter (see Chart 2.2). In the United States, the sharp drop in 
ten-year US Treasury bond yields led to the slope of the sovereign debt yield curve 
inverting in the two to ten-year segment for the first time since 2007, which has 
historically been considered as a leading indicator of future recessions in that 
country4. For their part, the yield on thirty-year bonds fell to record lows in the 
quarter, to below 2%. The ten-year sovereign debt yields also posted record lows in 
most euro area countries in mid-August. Since then, these yields have recovered 
somewhat, as in the case of equity markets.
2 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
4	 	See	 “The flattening of the yield curve in the United States”.	J.	C.	Berganza	and	A.	Fuertes,	Economic	
Bulletin,	Banco	de	España,	March	2018.
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The	yield	spreads	on	high-risk	debt	moved	 in	accordance	with	 the	shifts	 in	
risk	aversion	in	the	quarter. Thus, for example, the US corporate high-yield spread 
(over the sovereign bond) continued to narrow in July, but then widened significantly 
in August. In September, in line with the more positive performance of other markets, 
this spread narrowed again and, at the cut-off date of this report, stood at a level 
similar to that posted at the start of the quarter. In the foreign exchange markets, the 
yen appreciated sharply in August, which is consistent with its traditional consideration 
as a safe-haven asset. In turn, the pound sterling depreciated by 1.7% in the quarter 
owing to the uncertainty surrounding Brexit. The price of gold, also considered a 
safe asset in times of uncertainty, rose by 6.6% during the quarter.
The performance of financial markets in Q3 was influenced by the bout of volatility and strong risk aversion in August, mainly owing to the 
trade tensions between the United States and China, and by improved investor sentiment in recent weeks. The main stock markets recorded 
moderate gains, while in Spain the IBEX 35 dropped back slightly. Yields fell sharply on sovereign debt markets for most of the quarter, as 
a result of the weak macroeconomic setting and investors searching for safe-haven assets.
STOCK MARKET PRICES RISE MODERATELY AND SOVEREIGN YIELDS DECLINE, AGAINST A BACKDROP 
OF INCREASED VOLATILITY
Chart 2
SOURCE: Datastream.
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3.1  External environment of the euro area
The global economy slowed down in Q2 and the high-frequency 
indicators suggest that weakness will persist over the coming months
In	2019	Q2	global	activity	slowed	across	the	board,	against	a	background	of	
high	uncertainty	owing	to	trade	tensions	and	higher	geopolitical	risks. Year-
on‑year global GDP growth decreased to 2.8%, 0.2 pp less than in Q1 and more 
than 1 pp below that recorded one year ago (see Chart 3.1). The weakness continues 
to be concentrated in investment, foreign trade and the manufacturing sector, while 
services and consumption remained robust (see Chart  3.2). The US economy 
remained on its slowing path, posting quarterly growth of 0.5%, compared with 
0.8% in Q1. Likewise, Chinese GDP moderated slightly in Q2, from 6.4% to 6.2% 
year-on-year. In the United Kingdom, GDP contracted by 0.2% quarter-on-quarter 
between Q1 and Q2, largely owing to the reversion of the accumulation of inventories 
imported in Q1, reflecting a situation clearly marked by the ongoing uncertainty 
associated with the Brexit process. In Latin America, growth picked up slightly in 
Q2, owing to better data in Brazil and Mexico, while economic indicators for Turkey 
continued providing negative signals. In general, the information relating to Q3 points 
to continued weakness in activity, in both advanced and emerging market economies. 
Against this backdrop, growth projections for the whole of 2019 have been revised 
downwards (see Chart 3.3).
Inflation	rates	in	the	main	advanced	economies	declined	once	again,	often	to	
below	 the	 central	 banks’	 targets. Inflation rates in most advanced economies 
declined in the last few months (see Chart 4.1), partly owing to changes in energy 
prices. Core rates remained very moderate overall and inflation expectations shifted 
downwards once again, particularly in the euro area and in the United States (see 
Chart 4.2). In the emerging market economies inflation slowed in almost all areas, as 
a result of the changes in the more volatile components, such as energy and food. 
One exception is the rise in inflation in China in recent months, largely as a result of 
the increase in food prices owing to the effects of swine fever.
World trade contraction has become sharper, against a background 
of heightened trade tensions 
World	trade	contracted	more	markedly	in	Q2	than	in	Q1.	Goods trade declined 
by 0.7% in the period from April to June as compared with the preceding quarter, 
3 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY
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following the 0.3% decrease in the first part of the year (see Chart 5.1), reflecting 
lower import activity in most advanced economies and in China. As regards more 
recent information, the US-China conflict escalated over the summer months (see 
Chart 5.2). In August the United States announced it would impose higher tariffs 
(of 10%) on a broad set of imports of consumer goods from China worth $260 
billion (in some cases the tariff is to be applied starting on 1 September and in 
others from 15 December). China retaliated with tariffs of 5%‑10% on $75 billion 
worth of imports from the United States. In turn, the United States reacted by 
Growth of the world economy fell in the second quarter of the year in line with expectations and the high-frequency indicators remained weak 
which led to downward revisions to growth for this year.
GLOBAL GROWTH SLOWED IN THE SECOND QUARTER IN LINE WITH EXPECTATIONS, AND GROWTH PROJECTIONS
FOR THE YEAR AS A WHOLE HAVE BEEN REVISED DOWNWARDS
Chart 3
SOURCES: National sources, Thomson Reuters, Consensus and JP Morgan.
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threatening to raise the tariffs announced, from 10% to 15%, and others already in 
force previously, from 25% to 30%, starting on 1 October. Additionally, the 
depreciation of the renminbi against the dollar to values below the reference rate 
of seven yuan to the dollar, led the US Treasury to designate China as “a currency 
manipulator”, and to consider it had engaged in unfair practices in accordance 
with international rules, announcing that it could take retaliatory measures. The 
latest news point to some easing of tensions, with statements in favour of seeking 
an agreement between the two powers and announcements of deferrals and 
reductions for certain tariffs. However, there is still much uncertainty in this 
connection. Box 2 estimates the potential impact of these heightened trade 
tensions on the global economy. On a more positive note, a trade agreement 
reached between the European Union and Mercosur at the end of June is 
noteworthy. Its main aspects are described in Box 3.
Oil prices were highly volatile in the days prior to the cut-off date of this report, 
despite following a predominantly bearish trajectory over the course of the 
past quarter. The sluggishness of oil prices was interrupted in mid-September by a 
terrorist attack on the oil infrastructure of Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s main oil 
producers. The impact of this attack, which is uncertain in the medium term, drove 
up the price of Brent crude oil to around $65 per barrel. The effects of this could last 
for months. Other commodity prices, except those of safe-haven assets, such as 
gold, fell.
The inflation rates in the main advanced economies have tended to decrease, except for in the United Kingdom. Medium-term inflation 
expectations are also heading down, especially in the United States and the euro area.
OVERALL INFLATION AND INFLATION EXPECTATIONS HEADING DOWN
Chart 4
SOURCES: National sources and Thomson Reuters.
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The monetary policy stance has become more expansionary, with the 
notable exception of Argentina, which is once again experiencing 
significant financial tensions 
This	 configuration	 of	 greater	 risks	 to	 growth	 and	 absence	 of	 inflationary	
pressures	has	again	led	to	an	easing	of	monetary	policies	worldwide. In its July 
meeting, the US Federal Reserve cut the federal funds interest rate target by 25 bp 
to a range of 2%-2.25%, as a preventive measure against a global slowdown and the 
risks arising from the trade conflict. This was the first cut since 2008. It also brought 
forward the end of its balance sheet reduction process by two months. In September, 
the Federal Reserve further cut its benchmark interest rate range by 25 bp. For its 
part, as detailed below, the ECB approved a comprehensive package of measures 
with a strong accommodative bias at its September meeting, notably including the 
reduction of the interest rate on the deposit facility by 10 bp and the resumption of 
net asset purchases. At the cut-off date of this report, the markets assume that the 
Federal Reserve’s benchmark interest rate will be 25 bp below its current level in 
December 2019 and that the interest rate on the deposit facility of the ECB will 
remain unchanged for the rest of the year. In both cases, benchmark interest rates 
are expected to be higher than anticipated a few weeks ago, most likely owing to the 
recent improved outlook on the trade conflict between the United States and China. 
The monetary policy stance in the emerging market economies has also become 
Trade data for most areas were weak in Q2. As a result of the heightening of trade tensions between the United States and China, with the 
introduction of new tariffs, the outlook for trade relations is gloomy.
WORLD TRADE HAS CONTRACTED AGAIN AND TRADE TENSIONS HAVE ESCALATED
Chart 5
SOURCES: National sources and CPB.
a Tariffs announced or imposed by the United States and China on bilateral imports of various products by volume imported in 2018.
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more dovish, with decreases in policy interest rates in a large number of countries in 
the face of signals of economic slowdown, greater global risks and generally 
contained inflation rates (see Chart 6.2).
The main exception to this overall picture is Argentina, which is once again in 
the midst of significant financial tensions. Following the primary elections held in 
early August, Argentina’s financial markets experienced a significant downturn. To 
curb the depreciation of the peso, the central bank responded by increasing the 
benchmark interest rate by 15 percentage points (see Chart 7.1). As tensions did not 
cease, the government announced its plan to implement a debt restructuring 
programme, extending the maturities of Treasury bills held by institutional investors 
mandatorily and those of longer-term debt securities held by resident and non-
residents voluntarily. The government also requested a change in the payment path 
of its debt to the IMF. Finally, as a result of the continued financial deterioration, 
capital controls and limits to dollar purchases were introduced in early September 
and the central bank temporarily abandoned its commitment to zero growth in the 
monetary base, allowing it to increase somewhat to avoid a potentially excessive 
monetary contraction.
The rest of the emerging financial markets were also affected by global 
uncertainty, although to a lesser extent. In August the exchange rates of the 
currencies of many of these economies depreciated, their sovereign spreads 
increased and the stock indices posted declines. However, the situation seems to 
The Federal Reserve cut the federal funds rate at its July meeting and markets are discounting fresh rate cuts. A looser stance is expected 
from central banks in the advanced economies and several central banks in emerging countries have cut their policy rates.
THE CURRENT AND EXPECTED MONETARY POLICY STANCE IS MORE ACCOMMODATIVE WORLDWIDE
Chart 6
SOURCE: xxxxx
a Hillor sequiatest dolut velique nimin et offic to dolume verio et, tes explatur? Um reperum ea nitia dolest veris re sanditi busaperum que 
eum exercil luptatus. Ut molest omnimet aut eum es id quam quae velicid ucilit aboratum si cupta est eosant expersp eroriberferi vellendunt 
por as adis rectur si ad esciet lat. Eptatem porerisimint amus, optaectiiste dollest ibusdae minveri onsentiaspe litaqui con nis aut quias ut 
enditatus niet que doles net et eius, tor ratur arcit ut autecat.
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have stabilised more recently, as the prospects of a trade agreement between the 
United States and China have improved (see Chart 7.2). 
3.2  The euro area and the monetary policy of the European Central Bank
Against this background of global uncertainty, the euro area continued 
to be immersed in a scenario of low growth and economic slowdown
GDP	growth	decelerated	in	2019	Q2,	largely	owing	to	the	decline	in	exports. 
The information received after the June report confirmed that the upswing in activity 
in Q1 was temporary. In Q2 GDP rose only by 0.2% quarter-on-quarter in the euro 
area as a whole, after posting 0.4% in Q1 (see Chart 8.1), weighed down by weak 
exports and subdued investment. Conversely, private consumption continued to 
expand, driven by the relative robustness of the labour market. From the supply 
standpoint, industrial activities contracted during this period, while services 
continued to perform more favourably. Of the four main economies in the area, the 
slowdown in activity affected Germany and Italy, while GDP in France and Spain 
grew at a similar rate to that in the previous quarter (see Chart 8.2). The contraction 
Following the primary elections in Argentina, the peso depreciated considerably and the central bank raised the interest rate to stem the 
currency's loss of value. Other emerging markets were also affected by global events in the summer, although the situation seems to have 
stabilised more recently.
EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS, ESPECIALLY ARGENTINA, WERE HIT BY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE QUARTER
Chart 7
SOURCES: JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley and Thomson Reuters.
a An increase represents a depreciation.
b Until 29 April: "non-intervention zone".
c EMBI (sovereign spread), EMCI: published by JP Morgan; MSCI, published by Morgan Stanley.
d An increase represents an appreciation.
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of the German economy in Q2 is noteworthy. For the area as a whole, year-on-year 
growth declined by 0.1 pp, to 1.2% (see Chart 8.3).
Available indicators suggest that the weakness in economic activity in the euro 
area persisted in the third quarter of the year, particularly in industry. The information 
available for the current quarter points to the prolongation of the low growth path, in the 
complex international setting described previously. Indeed, the heightened US-China 
trade tensions and the increasing uncertainty associated with the Brexit process, together 
with the gradual slowdown in the Chinese economy and the vulnerability of certain 
emerging economies, shape an unfavourable environment for such open economies to 
international trade as the European ones. Thus, the indicators relating to trade and 
industrial activity (industrial production, export order books, manufacturing confidence 
and industrial production expectations) continued weakening in the third quarter of the 
year. Also, some of the qualitative indicators of activity and employment in services 
posted a shift downwards, which could indicate that the weakness is starting to spread 
to these activities. The slowdown in employment, together with the gradual decrease in 
consumer confidence in Q3, point to a more modest growth of private consumption, 
which has been to date the main driver of growth.
The Eurosystem’s forecasts revised down the GDP growth expectations for 
the euro area, especially for 2020. The September projection exercise forecasts 
Euro area GDP resumed a low-growth path in Q2, in line with the decline in exports. Germany's economy cooled and Italy's continued to 
stagnate. As for Q3, weak industry and the fragile external sector have begun to affect services and employment.
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE EURO AREA REMAINS MODERATE
Chart 8
SOURCES: Eurostat, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, European Commission, Markit Economics and European Central Bank.
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GDP growth of 1.1% for 2019 and 1.2% for 2020, in both cases below the June 
forecasts. This downward revision, against the backdrop of accommodative 
financing conditions for the economy overall, mainly reflects the deterioration in the 
growth expectations for world trade, on account of the renewed trade tensions and 
the economic slowdown in China and other emerging market economies (see 
Table 2). In the more medium term activity is expected to recover, underpinned by 
persistently favourable financial conditions, the slightly expansionary fiscal policy 
stance and the gradual disappearance of political and trade uncertainties. 
Nevertheless, there are still significant downside risks to this core scenario, mainly 
deriving from the possibility of a no-deal Brexit and of an escalation in trade 
tensions. By contrast, on the domestic front, the recent political tensions in Italy 
seem to have eased somewhat.
Inflation has remained low, distant from monetary policy reference 
values, and further reductions in inflation expectations were observed
Inflation	in	the	euro	area	remains	low. In Q3, euro area inflation was marked 
by the downward momentum in energy prices and the persistently moderate 
inflation rates in services and industrial goods. The year-on-year rate of change 
in the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) held steady at 1% in August, 
for the second consecutive month, after rising over 2% towards the end of 2018. 
This reflects the changes in energy prices, which contracted in August, a move 
that was partly offset by a marked increase in unprocessed food inflation. Core 
inflation, which excludes energy and food prices, remained at 0.9% (see Chart 
9.1) as both services and non-energy industrial goods continued to record very 
moderate inflation. In the case of wage negotiations, the most recent information 
points to wage growth of around 2.5%, similar to that recorded in previous 
months. Lastly, the sharp fall in oil prices may have tempered business costs 
(Chart 9.2).
EURO AREA GDP AND HICP GROWTH FORECAST (a)
Table 2
SOURCE: ECB, European Commission, Consensus Forecast, IMF and OECD.
a The figures in brackets are the change with respect to the previous forecast, which relates to June 2019 for the ECB, May for the EC, May 
for the OECD, April for the IMF and August for Consensus.
120202029102
GDP HICP GDP HICP GDP HICP
European Central Bank (September 2019) 1.1 (-0.1) 1.2 (-0.1) 1.2 (-0.2) 1.0 (-0.3) 1.4 (0.0) 1.5 (-0.1)
——)1.0-( 3.1)1.0-( 4.1)1.0-( 3.1)0.0( 2.1)9102 yluJ( noissimmoC naeporuE
———)4.0-( 0.1—)1.0-( 1.1)9102 rebmetpeS( DCEO
International Monetary Fund (July 2019) 1.3 (0.0) — 1.6 (0.1) — — —
Consensus Forecast (September 2019) 1.1 (0.0) 1.1 (0.0) 1.1 (-0.1) 1.3 (-0.1) — —
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This	 lack	of	 inflationary	pressure	and	the	fragility	of	demand,	together	with	
expectations	of	lower	oil	prices	and	of	deterioration	of	the	global	environment,	
prompted	a	new	cut	in	the	Eurosystem’s inflation	forecasts	(see Table 2). These 
forecasts were revised down to 1.2% for 2019 and, following a cut of 0.4 pp, to 1% 
for 2020. The inflation forecast for 2021 is 1.5%, clearly below the monetary policy 
target.
At	the	Governing	Council	meeting	of	12	September	the	ECB	resolved	to	launch	
a	package	of	measures	with	a	clearly	accommodative	stance,	to	support	the	
convergence	 of	 inflation	 to	 its	 medium-term	 target. In particular, the ECB 
resolved to lower the interest rate on the deposit facility by 10 bp, to -0.50%, and 
reinforced its forward guidance on interest rates, indicating that they will remain at 
their present or lower levels until the inflation outlook is seen to be “robustly 
converging” to a level “sufficiently close” to, but below, 2%. Such convergence 
should also be consistently reflected in core inflation dynamics. The ECB also 
resolved to resume net purchases under its asset purchase programme (APP), at a 
monthly pace of €20 billion as from 1 November and without a defined time limit. In 
order to preserve favourable bank lending conditions, the modalities of the new 
series of quarterly targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO III) were also 
changed, eliminating the 10 bp spread previously established on the interest rates 
applicable to these operations and extending their maturity from two to three years. 
Overall inflation in the euro area stabilised at 1% in August due to the offsetting of the food and services components, while core inflation 
stood once again at 0.9 %. The downward dynamics in energy prices will influence the path of inflation in the next few months.
EURO AREA INFLATION REMAINS LOW
Chart 9
SOURCE: Eurostat.
a In 2019 including the effect of the transformation in France of the tax deduction for competitiveness and employment (CICE) into a 
permanent decrease in social security contributions.
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
2016 2017 2018 2019
 TOTAL INDEX
 HICP EXCLUDING FOOD AND ENERGY
1  HARMONISED INDICES OF CONSUMER PRICES
%
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
DE FR IT ES NL
EURO AREA
%
3  TOTAL HICP
August 2019
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
2016 2017 2018 2019
 COMPENSATION PER EMPLOYEE (a)
 ULCs (a)
 GDP DEFLATOR
2  WAGES AND COSTS
%
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 54 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 3/2019  QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
Lastly, to support the bank-based transmission of monetary policy, the introduction 
of a two-tier system for reserve remuneration was announced that will mean that 
part of banks’ holdings of excess liquidity will be exempt from the negative deposit 
facility rate.
The	Bank	Lending	Survey	(BLS)	shows	that,	in	Q2,	credit	standards	tightened	
for	loans	to	enterprises,	for	the	first	time	since	2014,	and	also	for	consumer	
credit	and	other	lending	to	households,	in	this	case	in	keeping	with	the	pattern	
that	began	in	2018	H2. Credit standards remained broadly unchanged for housing 
loans. For Q3, banks expected credit standards to ease for consumer credit and to 
remain unchanged for loans to enterprises and housing loans. The BLS shows that 
demand rose in all segments in Q2. For Q3, banks expected demand to continue to 
grow, especially demand for consumer credit.
Growth	in	bank	lending	to	non-financial	corporations	remains	robust,	up	3.9%	
year-on-year	 in	 July. In recent months firms have made more use of financing 
through debt securities, which grew by 4.7% in July, 0.7  pp more than in April. 
Lending to households continues to improve gradually: consumer credit rose by 
6.2% in July (compared with 5.8% in April) while housing loan growth remained 
steady at 3.5%. As regards monetary aggregates, both M3 and M1 recorded year-
on-year growth in July that was slightly higher than that observed in April.
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The financial markets reflected the more risk-averse global environment
In	 Q3	 to	 date,	 developments	 on	 Spanish	 financial	 markets	 have	 been	
determined	mainly	by	a	more	risk-averse	global	environment. In this context, 
Spanish stock market indices suffered significant losses in August. In recent weeks, 
the easing of trade and geopolitical tensions has been conducive to a recovery in 
prices, so that, as at the cut-off date of this report, the IBEX 35 index stood at very 
similar levels to those recorded at end-June (a fall of 0.2%). This fall, which contrasts 
with the rise of 2.8% in the European stock market over the same period, appears 
to be mainly influenced by the poorer stock market performance of Spanish banks 
relative to other euro area banks and the relatively high weight of Spanish banks in 
the IBEX.
The	 greater	 risk	 aversion	 of	 investors	 in	 the	 quarter	 and	 the	 more	
accommodative	monetary	policy	stance	led	to	significant	falls	in	government	
debt	yields. The Spanish ten-year bond yield reached a historic low in August of 
0.06%. Despite the rise in recent weeks, as at the cut-off date of this report, the 
yield was still some 20 bp below its end-June level. Given that the yield on the 
equivalent German bond has fallen by a similar amount during the quarter, the risk 
premium on Spanish debt over German debt has held stable, at around 75 bp. 
Finally, in line with the downward revision in July and August to the expected 
future path of interest rates, 12-month Euribor fell to -0.40%, although the 
subsequent rise in expected rates means that, at the cut-off date of this Report, 
it stood at -0.30%.
Financing	conditions	for	households	appear	to	have	tightened	slightly	in	2019	
Q2. As in the first quarter of the year, the Bank Lending Survey (BLS) for the second 
quarter signals a tightening of lending standards for households (see Chart 10.1). 
This appears to be the result of a fall in banks’ risk tolerance and, in the case of 
consumer credit and other lending, a perception of lower borrower solvency, which 
would be consistent with the recent increase in non-performing loans in this segment. 
In the same vein, the BLS also shows a tightening of the margins applied to riskier 
loans for house purchase. In the case of non-financial corporations, lending 
standards appear to have remained unchanged, while the general terms and 
conditions appear to have even been eased. The cost of bank financing has remained 
relatively stable in all segments, except that of loans for house purchase, in which it 
fell somewhat in June and July (see Chart 10.2). 
4 THE SPANISH ECONOMY
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The Spanish economy remains on an expansionary course, although 
the rate of growth appears to be moderating, against a background in 
which the deterioration in the external sector appears to have begun to 
have a negative impact on domestic demand
The	Spanish	economy	maintained	a	relatively	sustained	growth	rate	in	2019	
Q2,	against	a	backdrop	of	uncertainty	and	weak	world	trade. Specifically, GDP 
increased, as in the first quarter, by 0.5%, in seasonally adjusted quarter-on-quarter 
terms. That said, a change in the composition of growth was discernible, with a 
decline in the contribution of domestic demand and a larger positive contribution 
from the external sector (see Chart 11). The slowdown in domestic demand was 
particularly pronounced in the case of investment in capital goods, which fell relative 
to the previous quarter, in a setting characterised by the presence of elements of 
uncertainty and by the weakness of international trade, which is having a greater 
impact on the manufacturing sector. Also notable was the slowdown in private 
consumption, with a quarter-on-quarter growth rate of zero, the lowest rate since the 
start of the recovery. Meanwhile, the contribution of net external demand, positive 
According to the BLS, lending standards for households have tightened in recent months, while they remained stable for loans to 
corporations. The cost of financing for house purchase dropped by almost 20 bp in June and July. This fall may be partly a consequence of 
the decrease in interest rates during this period. It may also have been influenced by the entry into force of the new Real Estate Credit Law, 
although it is still early to assess the channels through which this effect would have materialised and whether they are temporary or 
permanent. The cost of market financing for non-financial corporations fell sharply in the year to date, increasing its appeal to companies.
FINANCING CONDITIONS FOR HOUSEHOLDS APPEAR TO HAVE TIGHTENED SLIGHTLY IN 2019 Q2
Chart 10
SOURCES: Datastream and Banco de España.
a Indicator = percentage of banks that have tightened their credit standards considerably × 1 + percentage of banks that have tightened 
their credit standards somewhat × 1/2 – percentage of banks that have eased their credit standards somewhat × 1/2 – percentage of 
banks that have eased their credit standards considerably × 1.
b The interest rates on bank loans are NDER (narrowly defined effective rate).
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for the fourth quarter in a row, increased, as a result of rather less pronounced 
growth in imports – which were unexpectedly low – than in exports.
According	 to	 new	 information	 available,	 activity	 was	 somewhat	 weaker	 in	
recent	 quarters	 than	 previously	 estimated. The INE has recently revised the 
National Accounts time series (see Box 8). The new data point to a certain loss of 
momentum in the growth of activity since the beginning of last year. Also, from 
summer 2018, the strength of domestic demand  (and, in particular, of private 
consumption) appears to have been less pronounced than was estimated on the 
basis of the data previously available.
GDP	is	estimated	to	have	slowed	by	0.1	pp	in	Q3,	to	a	rate	of	0.4%	quarter-on-
quarter.	Growth appears to have been supported by higher domestic demand growth, 
underpinned by a certain rise in investment (especially investment in capital goods, 
following its sharp contraction in Q2) and private consumption. These developments 
appear to have offset the foreseeably negative contribution from external demand, 
although the information available on the latter is still very incomplete.
The	Spanish	economy	maintains	a	positive	growth	differential	relative	to	the	
euro	 area,	 but	 is	 not	 immune	 to	 the	 persistence	 of	 uncertainty	 and	 the	
deterioration	 in	 the	 external	 environment.	 The Spanish economy’s positive 
The Spanish economy continues to be more dynamic than the other main euro area economies. Output growth will continue to be underpinned 
by domestic demand.
THE SPANISH ECONOMY REMAINS ROBUST
Chart 11
SOURCES: INE, ECB and Banco de España.
a For 2019 Q3, Banco de España forecasts for the Spanish economy and ECB forecasts for the euro area.
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growth differential relative to the euro area as a whole is estimated to have been 
sustained in Q3. This occurred against a background of widespread downward GDP 
growth revisions which, albeit with less intensity, are also affecting Spain.
Employment	growth	appears	to	have	continued	to	slow	in	Q3. The latest data 
available on Social Security registrations point to a slowdown in employment during 
the summer months. On average, monthly employment growth between May and 
August was lower than during the first months of the year. This employment 
slowdown, which was relatively broad-based across the market-economy sectors, 
was somewhat more pronounced in construction and industry (see Chart 12). For its 
part, the unemployment rate, according to the Spanish Labour Force Survey, stood 
at 14% in Q2, down 1.3 pp from its level in the same period a year earlier. However, 
a slowdown was discernible, at the same time, in the rate of decline in the number of 
unemployed which, according to the registered unemployment data, continued in 
July and August, as a consequence of the moderation in employment and the 
increase in the labour force.
Domestic demand is expected to make a positive contribution to 
growth, although the outlook for private consumption and investment is 
subject to downside risks
Private	consumption	appears	to	have	recovered	some	momentum	in	Q3. On 
the information available, the rate of growth of household spending is estimated to 
Employment growth slowed in the summer months, although the downward trend in the unemployment rate has continued.
THE MODERATING TREND IN THE PACE OF JOB CREATION HAS BECOME MORE PRONOUNCED
Chart 12
SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Trabajo, Migraciones y Seguridad Social and Banco de España.
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have been slightly positive between July and September, having stood at zero in the 
preceding quarter (see Chart 13). Pointing in the same direction is the information on 
retail trade, which shows a somewhat more favourable performance in recent 
months, and the stock of consumer credit, which has risen slightly following the 
slowdown seen from mid-2018. However, as mentioned, Social Security registrations 
have grown more slowly than in previous quarters. Also, against the background of 
greater uncertainty described above, confidence indicators continue to behave 
unfavourably. Finally, spending on durable goods appears to be contracting, against 
a background in which the process of absorption of the pent-up demand for this 
type of goods that built up during the crisis appears to be nearing completion.
Private consumption is estimated to have regained some buoyancy in Q3, although recent developments in employment, slowing credit and 
a backdrop of greater uncertainty pose risks to this continuing in the medium term.
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION HAS REGAINED SOME BUOYANCY
Chart 13
SOURCES: European Commission, INE and Banco de España.
a Data observed until July and forecasts for the remainder of the quarter.
b Calculations based on three-month cumulative flow.
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The	low	level	of	the	household	saving	rate	suggests	that	this	type	of	spending	
will	continue	to	be	less	buoyant	in	future	quarters. In this respect, in the absence 
of complete revised time series for household accounts, the most recent National 
Accounts data relating to nominal consumption and employment income point to a 
saving rate that is possibly even lower than estimated up until now (although it 
appears to have risen recently). Conversely, consumption continues to be buoyed by 
the still sustained rate of job creation, the ongoing low level of financing costs and 
the strength of the financial position of the household sector at aggregate level.
The	phase	of	less	buoyant	residential	investment	that	began	in	2018	appears	
to	have	continued.	From the second half of 2018, a growing number of activity 
indicators for the sector began to show decreasing strength, a trend that has 
become more evident in 2019. In particular, in recent months, there has been a 
reduced buoyancy of housing sales (both in the new construction segment and, 
in somewhat more pronounced fashion, in the second-hand segment), and of new 
loans for house purchase, the volume of which declined year-on-year during the 
period from the beginning of June to the end of July. This phenomenon, which 
had not occurred since early 2014, may be partly a consequence of the entry into 
force of the new real estate credit law, which has given rise to a process of 
adaptation by financial institutions and other agents to the new legal framework 
(see Chart 14.1). As this adaptation is completed, the flow of property transactions 
can be expected to become more buoyant than that observed during the summer 
months.
Also,	the	rate	of	growth	of	house	prices	has	recently	moderated.	The slowdown 
in this variable began in late 2018 in the case of second-hand housing, while in that 
of new housing it has been limited to the latest data, for Q2. In the latter segment, 
prices continue to display high growth rates, which has brought their level close to 
the historic high of 2008 Q3. The price of second-hand housing, in contrast, is still 
well below its pre-crisis high, which was reached a year before that of new housing.
Following	 its	decline	 in	Q2,	business	 investment	appears	to	have	picked	up	
somewhat	in	Q3.	This is what the latest data for certain indicators, such as capital 
goods imports and commercial vehicle registrations, suggest. Also, the environment 
in which this investment is made continues to have positive features, such as the 
persistence of a high level of capacity utilisation, financial conditions that remain 
favourable and the ongoing tendency for the financial position of non-financial 
corporations to improve. However, some indicators, such as the manufacturing PMI, 
suggest a certain intensification of the deterioration in confidence in the sector, 
against a background of continued global uncertainty, which may check the 
expansion of this demand component in future (see Chart 15).
In	this	context,	the	financing	of	non-financial	corporations	has	continued	to	
expand	 year-on-year. This is a consequence of the increase in corporate debt 
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issuance, boosted by the sharp decline in market interest rates, which has offset the 
contraction in the stock of credit obtained from resident institutions and in financing 
from abroad, the cost of which has fallen by comparatively less (see Chart 14.2).
Goods exports grew at a moderate pace, while the recovery of imports 
strengthened
The	 external	 sector	 is	 expected	 to	 post	 a	 negative	 contribution	 to	 output	
growth	 in	Q3,	 reflecting	the	more	marked	 increase	 in	 imports	as	compared	
with	exports. In Q2, foreign trade transactions gained some momentum, following 
the slackness observed in Q1. In any event, the subdued growth of imports, lower 
than projected, gave rise to a significant positive contribution from external demand 
to quarter-on-quarter GDP growth. On the very limited information available to date 
for Q3, export growth continues to be conditioned by the decline in external demand, 
affected by the renewed protectionist tensions and the slowdown in industrial activity 
(see Chart 16). The indicators of the outlook for foreign orders by the main areas —
including the euro area, which is Spain’s main export market— continue to point to 
a prolongation of this slackness in the coming months. For their part, imports show 
New lending has contracted in practically all segments. Lending in the house purchase segment has fallen since June, which could be 
related to the entry into force of the new Real Estate Credit Law, although it is still early to assess the temporary or permanent nature of the 
factors which have influenced this. In recent months non-financial corporations' financing through the issuance of debt securities has risen 
notably, boosted by the lower cost of these instruments.
NEW LENDING HAS CONTRACTED AT THE SAME TIME AS MARKET FINANCING OF NON-FINANCIALCORPORATIONS 
HAS INCREASED
Chart 14
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Calculations based on three-month cumulative flow.
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some signs of a gradual realignment with their determinants, following their recent 
relative weakness.
Goods	exports	returned	to	positive	growth	rates	in	Q2.	This somewhat greater 
buoyancy comes after the cumulative contraction in 2018 and the early months of 
2019. On Customs figures, the increase in real goods exports mirrored a relatively 
widespread improvement by type of product, more marked for capital goods and 
energy products. The exception were sales of durable consumer goods (particularly 
cars), which continued to decline in year-on-year terms. By geographical area, the 
Investment in capital goods and intangibles is underpinned by high capacity utilisation, the improved financial position of firms and looser 
financial conditions. However, the recent downturn in industrial confidence and persisting uncertainty, both internally and externally, 
represent a risk factor.
BUSINESS INVESTMENT HAS PICKED UP AGAIN SLIGHTLY, AFTER DECLINING IN THE PREVIOUS QUARTER
Chart 15
SOURCES: European Commission, Markit Economics, INE and Banco de España.
a Includes machinery, capital goods, armament systems, cultivated biological resources and intellectual property products.
b Calculations based on three-month cumulative flow.
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increase in goods exports was somewhat more marked in sales to the EU, including 
the euro area. The trajectory of real imports appears to be moving in line with the 
behaviour of final demand. In this regard, the weak domestic and external demand 
for cars, a product with a very high import content, is having a downward impact on 
the growth profile of purchases abroad.
Turning	 to	 services	 exports,	 there	were	 some	signs	of	 a	 slowdown	 in	 non-
resident	 tourism	 during	 the	 summer	 months.	 According to the information 
available to July, year-on-year growth of total non-resident tourist spending is 
In 2019 Q3 a negative contribution by the external sector to quarter-on-quarter GDP growth is anticipated, against the background of a more 
marked pick-up in imports than in exports.
EXPORTS IMPACTED BY WEAK GLOBAL TRADE
Chart 16
SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo, European Commission, Markit and Banco de España.
a Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) figures at constant prices. Seasonally adjusted series.
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moderating, although growth rates remain positive thanks to the increase in the 
average spending per tourist, which has offset the slowdown in total tourist inflows. 
This more restrained growth, which affects the main source markets (in particular, 
British tourism) appears to be chiefly due to the recovery of some competitor 
destinations in the Mediterranean region (especially Turkey). On a more positive 
note, in the last few months, the geographical diversification of tourist inflows has 
continued, as a result of the rise in those from non-EU countries, whose average 
daily spending is, on average, comparatively higher.
The downturn in activity reflects developments in industry and 
construction
On	the	supply	side,	the	divergence	observed	between	the	manufacturing	and	
services	sectors	has	continued. In recent months, activity has slowed across the 
different sectors, albeit more markedly in industry. Specifically, the manufacturing 
PMI continued to gradually worsen until it contracted in August, while the related 
similar indicator for services remains consistent with activity growth, despite the 
declines observed. Social Security registrations confirm this diverging trend between 
the two sectors from the second half of 2018. The different relative performance of 
activity in industry and services could be related to factors such as the weakness of 
international trade and the unfavourable outlook in the external environment. More 
recently, the indicators relating to activity in construction, such as the figures on 
registrations, show that this sector has also slowed significantly. 
The latest information available on general government points to a 
slight reduction in the budget deficit in 2019 with respect to the 
previous year
Recent	developments	appear	 to	be	consistent	with	a	slight	 improvement	 in	
the	balance	of	public	finances	in	2019. Excluding local government, the general 
government deficit stood in 2019 Q1 at 2.1% of GDP, 0.2 pp up on the same period 
a year earlier. This slight deterioration can be largely explained by the higher spending 
arising from the different timetables for approving the revaluation of pensions and 
public-sector wages in 2018 and 2019, which should be corrected in the second half 
of 20195. Accordingly, the most recent information appears to be consistent with an 
improvement for the year as a whole, largely due to the favourable behaviour of 
5	 	In	 2018,	 the	 revaluation	 of	 pensions	 and	 public-sector	 wages	 became	 effective	 from	 July,	 albeit	 with	
retroactive	validity	from	January,	following	approval	of	the	State	and	Social	Security	Budget	Law	on	3	July	
(Law	6/2018).	However,	 in	 2019,	 the	 revaluation	was	 approved	 in	 late	December	 2018,	 effective	 from	
January	1	(Royal	Decree	Law	24/2018 y 28/2018).
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social security contributions which, in turn, partly reflects the measures approved in 
late 2018. By contrast, tax revenues have slowed somewhat, in line with economic 
developments, leading to a moderation in the growth of the tax bases. 
The European authorities have confirmed that the Spanish general government 
sector has left its “excessive deficit” situation behind, but point to a high risk 
of failing to comply the requirements for convergence towards a balanced 
structural budget in the medium term. In June the EU Council approved the 
abrogation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, to which the Spanish economy has 
been subject since 2009. Spanish public finances have now come under the so-
called preventive arm of the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact. On the available 
estimates, the structural deficit of the Spanish general government is still a long way 
from the medium-term objective of 0%, requiring new measures to be adopted in the 
coming years. Specifically, the EC has recommended that the Spanish authorities 
make a structural adjustment of 0.65%of GDP in both 2019 and 2020, and to limit 
growth in eligible public spending6 to 0.6% and 0.9%, respectively. However, the 
upcoming general elections make it virtually impossible for the 2020 State budget to 
be approved before the end of this year, which would mean yet another extension of 
the 2018 State budget.
Growth in consumer prices has moderated as a result of the 
performance of the energy component, in a setting of contained 
external inflationary pressures, although wages are rising on the 
domestic front
Inflation, measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), has 
eased in recent months to stand at 0.4% in August (see Chart 17). This largely 
reflected the slowdown in energy prices. Core inflation grew by 1.2% in August (a 
similar rate to that observed since late 2017), despite the widening of the positive 
output gap, which points to a growing use of productive factors. In terms of 
components, services inflation stood at 1.5%, similar to the rate observed since the 
beginning of 2018, with temporary variations associated with tourism-related items. 
Non-energy industrial goods prices have quickened slightly in the last few months, 
to 0.6% year-on-year in August. The recent moderation of inflation has been 
somewhat more intense in Spain than in the euro area, thus broadening the negative 
differential between the two variables.
6  Eligible spending according to the expenditure rule applicable under the preventive arm of the SGP 
excludes interest expenditure, the non-discretionary elements of unemployment benefit expenditure and 
the expenses funded by the EU, and permanent revenue increases owing to regulatory changes (see Vade 
Mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact 2019).
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Inflation in Spain maintains a negative differential with that of the euro area, against the backdrop of lower-than-expected increases in the 
energy component, while core inflation is moving on a similar course. External inflationary pressures remain contained and a rise in wage 
costs is discernible.
MODERATE CONSUMER PRICES AND RISE IN WAGES
Chart 17
SOURCES: INE, Eurostat, Reuters, Ministerio de Trabajo, Migraciones y Seguridad Social and Banco de España.
a Indices calculated on the basis of PPI and IPIIP items that are reflected in the HICP.
b On information to August 2019.
c Break-even inflation calculated on the basis of inflation swaps.
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External	inflationary	pressures	are	very	modest,	in	the	context	of	the	recent	
decline	in	oil	prices. Crude oil prices moved on a downward path until mid-August, 
picking up slightly thereafter. This recovery intensified a month later, following the 
attacks on Saudi Arabian oil facilities. There is a much uncertainty as to whether the 
most recent rise in prices will last. In any case, this initial surge tended to moderate 
at the cut-off date of this report. In addition, the information drawn from the futures 
markets, which shows a markedly declining trend in crude oil prices, points to a 
predominantly temporary impact. For their part, the import prices of industrial non-
energy goods have continued to post moderate year-on-year growth rates. Domestic 
industrial producer prices have also maintained very contained growth.
The	 inflation	 rate	 in	 Spain	 in	 recent	 months	 has	 tended	 to	 be	 lower	 than	
forecast.	In particular, the increase in the energy component has been lower than 
expected, as a result of the negative surprises in electricity, gas and heating and 
vehicle fuel prices. That has led to a downward revision of HICP projections for 2019 
as a whole. In recent months, the projection for the HICP excluding energy and food 
for this year has also been revised slightly downwards, from growth slightly below 
1%, in view of the behaviour of services prices being less buoyant than expected. 
On	the	costs	side,	wage	indicators	have	risen	in	2019.	Wage rates under collective 
bargaining agreements have, on data to August, risen by an average of 2.3%, more 
than in the previous year (1.8%), affecting what is now a very large number of workers 
(8.4 million). These rises are considerably higher in newly signed agreements, 
benefiting 1.3 million workers to date. Specifically, the agreed wage rise in the latter 
is, on average, 3.6%, 0.6 pp higher than the upper bound of the benchmark range 
included in the most recent collective bargaining agreement. In the current context 
of heightened uncertainty about future economic developments, it would be 
desirable to ensure, on the one hand, that the agreed wage rises are closely aligned 
with the specific conditions of affected firms and sectors and, on the other, that the 
necessary flexibility instruments are put in place in collective bargaining processes 
to allow for labour costs to be adjusted in the event of adverse shocks and thus 
reduce their potential impact on employment.
20.9.2019.
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AVERAGE ANNUAL AND QUARTER-ON-
QUARTER GDP GROWTH RATES: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECTIONS 
AND MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS
José González Mínguez and Carmen Martínez Carrascal
Published on 18 September 2019
The average annual growth rate of GDP can be formulated algebraically as a weighted 
average of the quarter-on-quarter growth rates of the preceding and the current year. 
Sometimes this can give rise to counterintuitive results and misinterpretations of how 
the economy is evolving. For example, a given sequence of GDP growth rates, in quarter-
on-quarter terms, in the current year, may give rise to very different average annual 
rates depending on the trajectory of GDP in the preceding year. Also, with given quarter-
on-quarter growth figures for the four quarters of a particular year, average GDP growth 
will be higher, the earlier in the year that the largest quarter-on-quarter increases occur.
In the context of macroeconomic projections, analysis tends to focus on average 
annual GDP growth rates, insofar as they offer a summarised version of the outlook. 
However, it should be noted that revisions to the current year’s projections with a 
particular sign (for example, upwards) may reflect changes of two types: first, the 
publication of new, more favourable National Accounts data for past quarters; and 
second, a downward revision to growth prospects for the remaining quarters of the 
year. Therefore, it would be a mistake to conclude from the mere observation of an 
upward revision to average annual growth that the economic outlook has improved.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS: COMPARISON WITH 
AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL
Gergely Ganics and Eva Ortega
Published on 11 September 2019
The forecasting of macroeconomic variables is an important task of the Banco de 
España for the satisfactory monitoring of the economic situation. Macroeconomic 
projections are made by combining various econometric models with expert judgement. 
This article compares the Spanish GDP growth and inflation projections published by 
the Banco de España with those that would be obtained automatically from an 
alternative econometric model. This exercise reveals that the Banco de España’s 
projections surpass those of the econometric model in terms of how closely they 
coincide with the variables predicted (GDP and inflation), i.e. they have smaller prediction 
forecasting errors. This confirms that the information provided by expert opinion 
ANALYTICAL ARTICLES
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 70 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 3/2019  ANALYTICAL ARTICLES
improves the accuracy of projections, above all in short time horizons and, in particular, 
in predictions of GDP growth. It is also found that, in the past decade, the accurate 
prediction of inflation has been considerably more difficult than that of GDP growth.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RENTAL HOUSING MARKET IN SPAIN
David López-Rodríguez and María de los Llanos Matea 
Published on 1 August 2019
The proportion of the population living in rental housing in Spain is low compared with 
the main EU economies. However, in recent years there has been a perceptible rising 
trend in the relative weight of rental housing in the Spanish residential market. The most 
significant and dynamic aspects of this development are concentrated in specific 
groups (essentially young households, immigrants and temporary workers) and specific 
areas (above all in Madrid, Catalonia, the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands). One 
key factor behind the rise in the demand – especially among young households – for 
residential rentals is the difficulties lower-income groups face in raising their income. 
This is due to still-high unemployment, the scant duration of new employment contracts 
and the greater significance of shorter contract hours. The reduction in the average 
loan-to-value ratios of new mortgages, the concentration of economic activity in 
geographical areas with a rigid supply of residential housing and the tax arrangements 
associated with housing are other factors that have contributed to a notable increase in 
demand in the market for residential rentals in Spain. The rise in demand concentrated 
in specific markets set against a relatively rigid supply of residential rentals in the short 
term would explain the dynamism of rental prices in these locations. Such robust 
demand in specific markets has been countered only in part by the increase in private 
supply following the entry of new professionalised agents in the rental market. 
Encouraging these new entrants will have been the increase in the gross return on 
residential rentals in the 2014-2017 period. The diminished buoyancy of supply has 
come about against the background of the weak public supply of rentals, marked by 
the emergence of alternative sources for residential housing such as the holiday rental. 
For a fuller analysis of the residential rental market in Spain, greater socio-demographic 
and economic information would be needed – including rental prices – at the municipal 
level or with the greatest geographical breakdown possible.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FINANCING AND BANK LENDING 
TO THE NON-FINANCIAL PRIVATE SECTOR
Pana Alves, Fabián Arrizabalaga, Javier Delgado and Irene Roibás 
Published on 24 July 2019
This is the first of a series of analytical articles that will examine, on a half-yearly 
basis, recent developments in funds raised by the Spanish non-financial private 
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sector and resident deposit institutions’ credit exposure to the sector. In the early 
months of 2019, the conditions of access to bank finance for Spanish firms and 
households remained highly accommodative; however, after several years in which 
these conditions had gradually eased, signs are now emerging that suggest that this 
tendency may be coming to an end. Nevertheless, deposit institutions’ total 
outstanding credit exposure to the non-financial private sector continued to decline 
in 2019 Q1 (2.1% year-on-year). The NPL ratio also continued to fall.
BANK LENDING SURVEY IN SPAIN: JULY 2019
Álvaro Menéndez Pujadas 
Published on 23 July 2019
The results of the Bank Lending Survey reflect, in general, a slightly less expansionary 
credit supply, both in Spain and the euro area, in 2019 Q2. Thus, credit standards 
tightened in Spain in the two household segments, while in the euro area standards 
tightened for both lending to enterprises and consumer credit and other lending to 
households. By contrast, terms and conditions for new lending eased somewhat in 
the consumer credit segment, both in Spain and the euro area, while for lending to 
enterprises they eased in Spain but tightened in the euro area. Spanish banks 
reported a decline in demand for loans to enterprises and for consumer credit and 
other lending to households, whereas loan applications increased across the board 
in the euro area. The conditions of access to retail and wholesale financial markets 
remained stable or improved both in Spain and the euro area. According to the 
banks surveyed, regulatory and supervisory measures on capital, leverage and 
liquidity prompted a degree of tightening in the credit supply in 2019 H1, again both 
in Spain and the euro area. Lastly, between January and June 2019, the NPL ratio 
also contributed to some tightening of the credit supply in both areas.
FINANCIAL POSITION OF EURO AREA HOUSEHOLDS IN 2018
Ana del Río and José Antonio Cuenca 
Published on 11 July 2019
Drawing on the accounts for the institutional sectors, this article describes how euro area 
households’ income, savings, borrowing and financial wealth evolved in 2018. The 
improvement in the labour market and the more dynamic wage performance continued 
to boost household income and this, together with the increase in asset (especially 
housing) values, and against a backdrop of very low interest rates, sustained household 
expenditure. The saving rate rose slightly in the euro area overall, although with 
considerable differences between countries. Households’ demand for finance continued 
to grow at a moderate pace, resulting in a slight dip in their debt-to-income ratio.
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THE 2019 EUROPEAN SEMESTER AND THE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR SPAIN  FILE PDF: OPENS IN A NEW WINDOW 
Pilar García Perea, Jorge Martínez Pagés, Antonio Millaruelo de Lafuente and Carmen 
Sánchez Carretero 
Published on 6 August 2019
The European Semester is the process during which the European Commission 
designs and coordinates the Member States’ economic policies. The 2019 cycle 
began on 21 November 2018 and concluded on 9 July 2019. Overall, the reform drive 
in the member countries is perceived to have lost significant momentum, particularly 
in those with macroeconomic imbalances. On the fiscal front, the Stability and 
Growth Pact rules are a valuable road map ahead of the necessary consolidation of 
public finances; that said, their effectiveness in the preventive arm is still uncertain. 
As to structural policies, it would be worth exploring the creation of a national 
productivity board in those countries without one.
DEVELOPMENTS IN SPANISH PUBLIC DEBT IN 2018  FILE PDF: OPENS IN A 
NEW WINDOW 
Mario Alloza, Mar Delgado-Téllez, Blanca García-Moral and Víctor González-Díez 
Published on 3 July 2019
This note analyses the situation of Spanish general government debt in 2018. Public 
debt fell to 97.1% of GDP, owing mainly to high economic growth. The average life of 
the debt stood at 7.5 years, with securities representing 86.4% of total debt and with 
the holdings of non-residents accounting for a higher share. By sub-sector, central 
government continues to be the most indebted, with 86.7% of GDP, although 
financing to other sub-sectors has increased up to 18.9 pp of GDP. Lastly, this article 
offers a detailed description of the ongoing local government deleveraging.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
COUNTRIES AND CURRENCIES
In accordance with the protocol order, the EU Member States are listed 
using the alphabetical order of the country names in the national languages.
BE Belgium EUR (euro)
BG Bulgaria BGN (Bulgarian lev)
CZ Czech Republic CZK (Czech koruna)
DK Denmark DKK (Danish krone)
DE Germany EUR (euro)
EE Estonia EUR (euro)
IE Ireland EUR (euro)
GR Greece EUR (euro)
ES Spain EUR (euro)
FR France EUR (euro)
IT Italy EUR (euro)
HR Croatia HRK (Croatian kuna)
CY Cyprus EUR (euro)
LV Latvia EUR (euro)
LT Lithuania EUR (euro)
LU Luxembourg EUR (euro)
HU Hungary HUF (Hungarian forint)
MT Malta EUR (euro)
NL Netherlands EUR (euro)
AT Austria EUR (euro)
PL Poland PLN (Polish zloty)
PT Portugal EUR (euro)
RO Romania RON (New Romanian leu)
SI Slovenia EUR (euro)
SK Slovakia EUR (euro)
FI Finland EUR (euro)
SE Sweden SEK (Swedish krona)
UK United Kingdom GBP (Pound sterling)
JP Japan JPY (Japanese yen)
US United States USD (US dollar)
AIReF Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility
AMCESFI Macroprudential Authority Financial Stability Board
APP Asset Purchase Programme
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BE Banco de España
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BLS Bank Lending Survey
BOE Official State Gazette
CBA Central Balance Sheet Data Office Annual Survey
CBQ Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey
CBSO Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR Central Credit Register
CDSs Credit default swaps
CESR Committee of European Securities Regulators
CNE Spanish National Accounts
CNMV National Securities Market Commission
CPI Consumer Price Index
CSPP Corporate sector purchase programme
DGF Deposit Guarantee Fund
EBA European Banking Authority
ECB European Central Bank
ECOFIN Council of the European Communities (Economic and 
Financial Affairs)
EDP Excessive Deficit Procedure
EFF Spanish Survey of Household Finances
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Official Spanish Labour Force Survey
ESA 2010 European System of National and Regional Accounts
ESCB European System of Central Banks
ESFS European System of Financial Supervisors
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board
EU European Union
EURIBOR Euro interbank offered rate
EUROSTAT Statistical Office of the European Communities
FASE Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy
FDI Foreign direct investment
FROB Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation
GNP Gross national product
GOP Gross operating profit
GVA Gross value added
HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
ICO Official Credit Institute
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IGAE National Audit Office
IIP International Investment Position
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
LTROs Longer‑term refinancing operations
MFIs Monetary financial institutions
MREL Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities
MROs Main refinancing operations
MTBDE Banco de España quarterly macroeconomic model
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NAIRU Non‑accelerating‑inflation rate of unemployment
NCBs National central banks
NFCs Non‑financial corporations
NiGEM National Institute Global Econometric Model
NPISHs Non‑profit institutions serving households
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONP Ordinary net profit
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PER Price/earnings ratio
PMI Purchasing Managers’ Index
PPP Purchasing power parity
QNA Quarterly National Accounts
SAFE ECB Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
SEPA Single Euro Payments Area
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
TFP Total factor productivity
TLTROs Targeted longer‑tem refinancing operations
ULCs Unit labour costs
VAT Value Added Tax
WTO World Trade Organization
CONVENTIONS USED
M1 Notes and coins held by the public + sight deposits.
M2 M1 + deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months + 
deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years.
M3 M2 + repos + shares in money market funds and money 
market instruments + debt securities issued with an agreed 
maturity of up to two years.
Q1, Q4 Calendar quarters.
H1, H2 Calendar half-years.
bn Billions (109).
m Millions.
bp Basis points.
pp Percentage points.
... Not available.
— Nil, non‑existence of the event considered or insignificance 
of changes when expressed as rates of growth.
0.0 Less than half the final digit shown in the series.
